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ABSTRACT 
Maritime irregular warfare (MIW) has been around since 
the dawn of sea power. While conventional naval warfare 
holds the premier position in naval affairs, MIW constitutes 
a less understood but equally important "other" tradition 
that merits closer attention. History demonstrates a link 
between the evolution of regular naval warfare and its 
irregular counterpart. When fully understood and correctly 
utilized, MIW actions have proven extremely effective at 
providing unconventional solutions to complex military 
problems. Consistently, MIW forces have powerfully affected 
the outcomes of conflict both at sea and on land. Through 
the skillful employment of MIW, this long historical pattern 
can continue to affect the conflicts of the 21St century. 
In an era of rapid change, the ability to clearly 
identify and understand emerging trends in conflict and 
military affairs is an essential element in assessing MIW's 
future. As conventional warfare begins to realign for future 
threats, practitioners of MIW need to begin thinking 
proactively about how MIW can stay relevant, and the 
concerted actions that need to be taken in order to fit into 
the future of warfare. This thesis is an attempt to take a 
first glimpse of MIW's future. 
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Maritime irregular warfare (MIW) has been around since 
the dawn of sea power. While conventional naval warfare 
holds the premier position in naval affairs, MIW constitutes 
a less understood but equally important "other" tradition in 
naval affairs that merits closer attention. History 
demonstrates a link between the evolution and rise of 
regular naval warfare and its irregular counterpart. When 
fully understood and correctly utilized, MIW actions have 
proven extremely effective at providing unconventional 
solutions to complex military problems. Consistently, MIW ' 
forces have powerfully affected the outcomes of conflict 
both at sea and on land. Through the skillful employment of 
MIW, this long historical pattern can continue to affect 
conflicts of the 21St century. 
In an era of rapid change, the ability to clearly 
identify and understand emerging trends in conflict and 
military affairs is an essential element in assessing MIW's 
future. New types of crises, coupled with rapid 
technological change, have combined to produce an 
increasingly complex geostrategic operating environment. A s  
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conventional warfare begins to realign for future threats, 
practitioners of MIW will need to begin thinking proactively 
about how MIW can stay relevant, and the concerted actions 
that need to be taken in order to fit into the future of 
warfare. This thesis is an attempt to take a first glimpse 
of MIW‘s future. 
This thesis will first identify and examine the MIW 
concept, then analyze the recent developments in military 
affairs. The working hypothesis is that, together, these two 
areas hold the key to understanding MIW’s future. To this 
end, the arguments advanced will help develop a better 
understanding of the critical environmental factors and 
dynamic relationships that have combined to define MIW’s 
past, and will ultimately shape its future. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis begins by examining the MIW concept, and 
outlining the critical components that lie at its core. Due 
to MIW’s changing practices over time, a usable definition 
can only be reached by building an accurate typology of MIW, 
illustrated by brief historical case descriptions that best 
identify and explain the maritime irregular warfare 
phenomenon. The purpose of the examples included in the 
typology will be to show the range and versatility of the 
2 
M I W  concept and its progression through time. Along with the 
typology, an additional corollary hypothesis examining the 
interdependent relationship between the regular and 
irregular forms of naval warfare is included to further 
refine maritime irregular warfare conceptually. In addition, 
an overview of the current trends in M I W  will be conducted 
in order to clarify its current global posture. At the 
conclusion of this chapter, the reader should be up to date 
and armed with a general understanding of what M I W  is ,  where 
M I W  came from, and M I W ’ s  current global prospects. 
Following the capability chapter will be a look at 
developments in crisis, conflict, and war in the information 
age. The primary purpose of this is to build an analytical 
framework for understanding the future strategic environment 
and identifying the trends in military affairs. A majority 
of the themes and concepts developed in this chapter will 
come from existing literature and research pertaining to 
this subject. Therefore, this chapter will be organized to 
provide a condensed stocktaking of the most relevant 
concepts and themes consistently found throughout this body 
of work. 
Finally, by combining the arguments made in the M I W  
concept section with the analysis of information age 
conflict, this thesis will provide an assessment of M I W ’ s  
3 
future. The conclusions this thesis advances are not meant 
to provide a detailed step-by-step roadmap to MIW‘s future. 
Instead, it is hoped that a conceptual, yet valid and usable 
view of MIW’s future can be captured and projected as a 
future reference point to guide thinking and planning. In 
addition to putting the irregular side of naval warfare into 
perspective and offering a vision of MIW’s future, it is 
hoped that the approach and broader themes developed 
throughout this thesis will spark increased interest in, and 
discussion of, the future of maritime irregular warfare. 
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11. THE 'EVOLUTION OF MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Whosoever can hold the sea has command of 
everything. 
- T h e m i s t o c l e s  (524-469 B .  C.) 
The use of maritime irregular warfare in conflict is 
not a recent development. The irregular approach has been an 
integral part of naval warfare strategies ever since man has 
waged war upon or from the seas. Although these operations 
were not always conducted by, "specially organized, trained, 
and equipped military and paramilitary forces, 'I because 
they did exist outside the sphere of accepted conventional 
naval operations at the time, these earlier cases do merit 
inclusion as MIW operations. Prior to the advent of the 
specially organized maritime irregular warfare forces we see 
employed today, many operations were, and in some cases 
still are, undertaken by regular forces conducting irregular 
missions outside the realm of conventional operations. It is 
in this conrext that we are able to see the emergence of the 
maritime irregular warfare concept. This approach to MIW 
facilitates a much broader interpretation of the irregular 
1 Joint Pub 1-02, Depar tmen t  of Defense D i c t i o n a r y  o f  
M i l i t a r y  and  A s s o c i a t e d  Terms ,  1 December 1989. 
5 
approach, and of MIW as a concept, allowing the true origins 
and evolutionary nature of MIW to be better studied. In 
trying to build an analytically useful typology to help 
explain MIW, this broader approach also helps capture the 
concept and true spirit of the irregular approach to naval 
warfare. 
The primary goal of this section is to examine the 
advantages of the MIW concept and identify where MIW fits 
across the spectrum of naval warfare. Thus, this section is 
organized to recognize four distinct traits that, combined, 
help to explain maritime irregular warfare. To begin with, 
the M I W  typology is structured to trace MIW's historical 
links and show the evolution of MIW through time. Second, 
the typology provides a review of some of the different 
forms MIW has taken throughout history. The third objective 
of the typology is to recognize M I W ' s  ability to operate 
across different levels of war and along different time 
lines.* Finally, this thesis attempts to emphasize the key 
elements and traits that have historically characterized and 
shaped MIW operations. 
This has to do with M I W ' s  ability 
operational and strategic levels of 
offensively or defensively for both 
protracted special operations. 
to influence the 
war, and to be utilized 
short duration and 
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The historical cases referenced in this section are not 
meant to be detailed case studies. Instead they are used 
illustratively to help build the typology and aid in the 
identification of MIW's central themes and essential 
elements. The cases presented are examples of both 
successful and failed MIW operations. Often, the success or 
failures of these types of operations hinge on factors that 
have nothing to do with the validity of the concept or 
approach. By their very nature, MIW operations carry a high 
degree of operational risk, and success in combat can never 
be guaranteed. Relying solely on success or failure criteria 
as a means of explaining the MIW concept limits gaining a 
more comprehensive understanding. The cases discussed in 
this chapter were chosen in order to develop the most 
complete picture of the MIW phenomenon. 
A. THE MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE TYPOLOGY 
The origins of the maritime irregular warfare concept 
can be traced back to the classical period. Ancient maritime 
raiders, whether attacking shipping at sea or targets of 
opportunity ashore, represent the early beginnings of a form 
of MIW operations that would continue essentially unchanged 
well into the Middle Ages. It is in the ancient maritime 
raiding context that the first instances of the irregular 
7 
approach at sea can be seen. A sample of the early approach 
to MIW is described here, 
The Periclean Strategy in the Peloponnesian War, 
for example, relied heavily upon a protracted 
special operations campaign of pinprick raids 
against the Spartans and their allies. Later on, 
after the fall of the Roman Empire, the Vikings 
would raise raiding to a science, and incorporate 
also some elements of “persisting, ” as their 
occupations of Normandy and Sicily, and settlement 
of Russia, attest. Perhaps the most sustained 
raiding occurred, though, in the long twilight 
struggle between Islam and Christendom in the 
Mediterranean. For centuries, both parties preyed 
on the shipping of the other, sometimes sparking 
larger conflicts, as in Suleiman’s c o s t l y  (and 
unsuccessful) mid-16th century invasion of 
Malta. . . 
In this excerpt we can plainly see the ancient 
beginnings and early successes of the irregular approach to 
naval warfare. This passage also contains the threads of 
several other MIW-specific elements worth mentioning. First, 
is the compelling fact that naval guerrillas have been able 
to leverage the advantages of an indirect approach 
throughout the classical period, suggesting that MIW has 
long beer, a fundamental part of naval strategy. This, 
supported later by the proposition that a rise in 
conventional naval warfare leads directly to a rise in 
unconventional warfare, is an essential point providing the 
3 John Arquilla, ed., F r o m  Troy t o  Entebbe: Special 
Operations i n  Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham MD: 
University Press of America, 19961, 11. 
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foundation upon which the MIW concept is built. This quote 
also highlights the fact that MIW' s ancient beginnings were 
not confined to one particular area or group. Where there 
was combat on the water, inevitably there was an element of 
unconventional warfare in some form in order to complement 
and complete classical maritime strategies. Although the 
general form MIW took remained relatively consistent 
throughout this time period, the advantages of the irregular 
approach and the opportunities it afforded naval warfare 
strategists were already beginning to be thoroughly explored 
and tested as far back as the classical period. 
MIW took a major evolutionary step forward in the late 
1500's when Sir Francis Drake unleashed a new form of 
maritime raiding that changed the naval balance by refining 
and honing the tactics employed by earlier naval guerrillas. 
Drake's impact was significant, 
He was a master mariner and naval strategist who 
took full advantage of the marriage of gun and 
sail that revolutionized sea power and led to the 
many voyages of discovery and conquest that made 
Europeans the masters of the world for so long. 
Yet he also exhibited a particular talent for 
amphibious raiding, and for leading irregular 
forces on land. The tradition of special 
operations that he began had a powerful influence 
on British strategic thought; and one can see, in 
such conflicts as the Seven Years' War (1756-  
1763) , an almost Periclean approach to raiding as 
a means of wearing down the enemy.4 
I b i d . ,  11-12. 
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Already a highly respected mariner and strategist, 
Drake was able to strike targets ashore by coupling the 
mobility provided by the sea with an effective amphibious 
capability incorporating the use of small land forces. 
Drake's constant pressure and ubiquitous presence allowed 
him to win a long series of impressive engagements in the 
Caribbean and along the coasts of mainland Europe. Drake's 
land and sea operations also brought with them a distinct 
psychological effect. For example when Drake's fleet was 
rumored to be operating in a particular area, one author 
noted that in response, "[tlhe whole of the Caribbean area 
was by this time in a state of nervous hubbub in which the 
wildest rumours gained credence..."5 Drake's modification of 
the generic guerre  d e  course6 strategy to include 
strategically important targets ashore is significant in the 
evolution of MIW over time. As an analysis of Drake's 
exploits in the Caribbean at the time suggests, "It [Drake's 
f l e e t ]  had been absent just ten months and it had achieved 
moral and political results out of all proportion to its 
I b i d . ,  17. 
The French term guerre  de course refers to the age-old 
strategy of using fast ships for coastal defense and 
commerce raiding. 
10 
material consequences. " 7  By capitalizing on initiative, 
pertinent and time sensitive intelligence, and the strategic 
flexibility offered by his vision of the indirect approach, 
Drake was able to exploit opportunities for massive 
strategic, and economic, gain. In the process, his unique 
vision and unorthodox methods revolutionized sea power and 
his exploits had a lasting effect on British strategic 
thought. 
In an interesting side note, it was Drake's grand 
vision and success that spawned future naval guerrillas like 
the notorious Capt. Morgan, who continued the marauding 
tradition and became one of history's most feared corsairs. 
This indirect pattern of naval warfare persisted into 
modern times. For example, in World War I the British Royal 
Navy attempted several audacious strategic maritime special 
operations that continued the tradition pioneered by Drake. 
The two cases examined here were both in response to the 
effective German U-boat campaign slowly paralyzing British 
war production and sea communications. Together they show 
the range and versatility of the MIW concept in a more 
modern setting. The first example involves an examination of 
the Q-ship phenomenon described below. 
Arquilla, ed., From Troy t o  Entebbe: Special  Operations i n  
Ancient a n d  Modern T i m e s ,  19. 
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These [Q-ships] were innocent-looking merchantmen 
manned by volunteer naval crews with a powerful 
but carefully concealed armament. In the past, 
merchantmen had often been painted to look like 
men o‘war with dummy wooden guns. This ruse which 
saved many a ship from pirates or its country’s 
enemies was effectively reversed in the Q-ship, 
which rapidly assumed a legendary wolf-in-sheep’s- 
clothing reputation in the service. The formula 
for success with these vessels was to invite 
attack by proceeding alone in the danger areas. At 
least until 1917, the U-boat usually surfaced on 
sighting its intended victim and then, with or 
without warning, opened fire and sank the ship by 
gunfire, reserving torpedoes for special occasions 
and targets, like ocean liners and warships. On 
sighting a surfaced U-boat, a “panic party’’ would 
noisily take to the Q-ship‘s boat, perhaps 
’ complete with parrot cage, while the gun crews 
remained concealed awaiting their opportunity of 
giving the enemy a short, well-aimed, and fatal 
vol ley. 8 
Early Q-ship successes were encouraging, although their 
overall effectiveness as a submarine killer was never 
substantial, and diminished over time. The real strategic 
value, and overall effect, of this unique example of a 
maritime irregular warfare campaign is not found in terms of 
U-boat sinkings, but rather in the unintended consequences 
that followed the Q-ships’ employment. The fear of Q-ship 
operations forced the Kriegsmarine to radically change its 
submarine doctrine away from surfaced attacks. In turn, this 
shift toward sinkings without warning made U-boats less 
Richard Hough, The Great War at Sea 1914-1918 (Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 303-304. 
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~ 
effective because they ran out of torpedoes and had to 
return to base sooner, while at the same time angering 
~ 
, 
~ certain neutrals, in particular the United States, which 
I 
I 
~ Germany could not afford to have an enemy. 
Later in the war Britain again turned toward the 
~ 
advantages of MIW and the indirect approach in order to 
solve the German U-boat dilemma, except this time in the 
form of a strategic coup d e  main9  targeting several maritime 
choke points. As conceived, the blocking of Zeebrugge was 
designed to avoid the U-boat's strengths at sea and in port, 
and instead attack an alternative weakness by putting a 
"cork" in the German U-boat bases stationed along the coast 
of Flanders. 
The submarine base at Bruges, situated along the 
Flanders coast, afforded German U-boats operating against 
British shipping with an ideal offensive and defensive 
location. This proximity to the English Channel and the 
North Sea cut down on submarine transit time, allowing U- 
boats to spend more time on station attacking Allied 
targets. Defensively, the submarine pens at Bruges were 
equally formidable as this excerpt points out, 
I 9 Coup d e  m a i n  refers to operations that are characterized 
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There was no chance whatever of destroying the 
flotillas of U-boats and destroyers once they were 
inside their bases because they could simply fade 
away into the maze-like canals and channels 
inland. Bruges itself, eight miles from Zeebrugge 
with which it was linked by a ship canal, made a 
marvelous, virtually invulnerable, hide-out.1° 
In April 1918 the Royal Navy began preparations for an 
operation designed to take the U-boats stationed at Bruges 
out of the war by purposely sinking three blocking ships in 
the canal entrance located at Zeebrugge. The Zeebrugge 
operation was part of a much larger British effort to 
finally clear out the German wasps' nest in Flanders. These 
blocking ships would have the effect of cutting off German 
submarine access to the sea. In order to allow the blocking 
ships a reasonable chance of reaching the canal entrance, 
the British also decided to assault the heavily fortified 
mole, which guarded the entrance, with a relatively small 
landing force. 
As planned, the operation would commence with a 
deceptive naval bombardment and smoke screen designed to 
allow the task force to approach the port facility. The mole 
would then be cutoff from reinforcements by purposely 
ramming two explosive laden submarines into the only rail 
viaduct connecting the mole to the mainland, and then 
lo Hough, The Great War at Sea 1914-1918, 315. 
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detonating them. Finally, three specially equipped surface 
craft were to be brought alongside the mole allowing naval 
commandos to disembark and assault the gun emplacements that 
threatened to sink the blocking ships prior to reaching 
their designated positions. 
Although meticulously planned and rehearsed, the 
execution of this mission fell well short of the desired 
objective for several reasons. The wind patterns expected 
and needed in order to allow the assault force to approach 
the mole under smoke screen changed direction at the 
critical moment, leaving the British ships exposed to 
intense German shore fire. One of the two breaching 
submarines never arrived, although the second submarine did 
complete its mission by blowing a 100-foot gap in the 
viaduct. Under withering fire, the blockships were unabFe to 
sink themselves in their allotted positions. In the 
aftermath of the commando assault, which was the scene of 
some of the most brutal hand-to-hand fighting of the war, 
what was envisioned as a strategic coup de main provided 
only a mild inconvenience to the Germans. 
The World War One examples of MIW are important because 
together they show the range and versatility of the MIW 
concept. The Q-ship phenomenon and the blocking of Zeebrugge 
sit at opposite ends of the MIW spectrum (Figure 1). One a 
15 
protracted special operation waged against highly mobile 
targets at sea whose full effect could only be gauged over 
the long run. The other envisioned as a strategic coup de 
main against a fixed target ashore intended to reap 
immediate, decisive results. Both undertakings, although 
radically different in approach, possessed MIW's potential 
to shift the overall naval balance of the war with a small 
investment in men and materiel. 
Q-ship Campaign 
(Mobile Targets at Sea) 
Blocking of Zeebrugge 





Figure 1. The Maritime Irregular Warfare Spectrum 
There is no question that it took nerves of steel and a 
very "special" crew to man Britain's Q-ships. Perhaps just 
as important was the unconventional mindset that conceived 
of this plan and then allowed it to be put into action. 
Although the final numbers the Q-ships registered during the 
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war were small, the consequences of this protracted special 
operation played a decisive role in the war's outcome by 
provoking U.S. entry into the war in response to Germany's 
unrestricted U-boat attacks, especially direct torpedo 
attack without surfacing. Britain's employment of Q-ships 
during World War I serves as a classic example of MIW 
providing a vital unconventional function that would yield 
long-term, strategic results. 
In contrast to the subtlety of a protracted special 
operation, the blocking of Zeebrugge was launched with the 
intention of shifting the naval balance in a single decisive 
action. In the final analysis the blocking of Zeebrugge did 
not meet its intended objective. While the operation fell 
short of the desired result, undertaking the mission did 
provide Britain and the Royal Navy with sorely needed 
inspiration at a low point in the war. In addition, this 
bo ld  r.a-".al action on Germany's flank succeeded in diverting 
attention, and German forces, away from the stagnant land 
campaign in France. 
In recent times, maritime irregular warfare has 
continued to evolve alongside its conventional counterpart, 
as technological innovations allowed modern-day naval 
guerrillas to continue to exploit their maritime niche. For 
this reason, World War I1 provides the most comprehensive 
17 
picture of the MIW concept in action and it’s effect on 
conventional strategy. 
In the Pacific campaign, motor torpedo (PT) boats 
originally designed to conduct stealthy hit-and-run torpedo 
attacks on enemy shipping at night radically transformed 
their mission by the end of the war as, “the need for 
shallow-draft vessels to operate offshore in support of the 
ground forces”ll became apparent. Post -war analyses have 
called into question the P T ‘ s  reputation as a big-ship 
killer and found that PT capabilities in main fleet action 
have been overstated and romanticized.l2 Two factors that 
weighed heavily during all PT attacks were the experience 
level of the crew and the record of the notoriously 
unreliable, World War I-vintage, Mk 8 torpedo. For the PT 
boat, experience, reliable torpedoes, and aggressiveness 
were the keys to successful night attacks on larger vessels. 
Unfortunately, getting all three in the same PT boat at the 
opportune moment was rare. Even so, the P T ’ s  unconventional 
methods did afford U.S. strategists with a rapid reaction 
and low-cost means of blunting the Imperial Japanese Navy‘s 
11 Curtis Nelson, Hunters i n  the Shallows: A History of the 
PT Boat (Dulles VA:  Brassey’s, 1998), 163. 
1 2  William White, They Were Expendable (Naval Institute 
Press, 1998), is one book that overstates the PT’s torpedo 
attack capability. 
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conventional advantage early in the Pacific campaign as this 
excerpt points out, 
Though the PT's torpedo potency left much to be 
desired, they often succeeded, by the threat of 
their shadowy presence and the aggressiveness of 
their attacks, in "rendering the transport of 
supplies exceptionally difficult" and giving the 
Japanese ships "many a bitter pill to swallow.N13 
There is no doubt that the PT's were specialized 
weapons requiring specialized training and crews. Operating 
in small formations from isolated island bases, the 
nocturnal PT's proved far more effective later on in their 
"barge-busting" role against near shore Japanese logistical 
lines than in their originally conceived torpedo-throwing 
role. Toward the end of the war PT's were a well-integrated 
part of the U.S. strategy in the Pacific. The Allied 
response to Japanese near shore logistical traffic came in 
the form of a dynamic one-two punch, with PT's operating at 
night and aircraft intercepting barge traffic during the 
day. In addition these "mosquito boats" offered commanders a 
unique and unequaled flexibility by, "Transporting troops, 
landing secret reconnaissance patrols, and performing other 
close-support duties for land forces..."14 The versatility 
l3 Nelson, Hunters i n  the Shallows: A History of the PT 
B o a t ,  161. 
l4 I b i d . ,  168. 
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of this small unit and its ability to evolve over time 
allowed the P T ' s  to better serve the needs of the Fleet by 
affecting conflict at sea, in its limited torpedo boat role, 
and ashore, in its more effective attacks on Japanese supply 
lines. A realistic assessment of the P T ' s  value after the 
war reveals that, 
... the P T ' s  hull and engines gave the Allies a 
readily available, mass-producible, seaworthy, 
fast, maneuverable, shallow-draft gun platform for 
dealing with Japanese coast-hugging logistical 
traffic . . .  Because of them the United States Navy 
built not just a torpedo boat or a gunboat, but 
one superbly versatile man-of-war.l5 
Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean Theater, the Italian 
l o t h  Light Flotilla ( D e c i m a  Mas/Mariassalto) built a MIW 
organization that represented the cutting edge of 
unconventional naval warfare at the time. By utilizing a 
wide variety of platforms and capabilities during the war, 
Dec ima  Mas was able to contest the Allies conventional 
superiority in the Mediterranean. Geography seems to have 
played a role in why the Italians turned to unconventional 
rnariziT.5 a c z a c k s ,  "From the Italian perspective, their Navy 
was sandwiched between the British Mediterranean Fleet at 
Alexandria and the French Fleet at Toulon together with such 
British forces as could be deployed from the Atlantic 
l5 I b i d . ,  2 0 6 - 2 0 7 .  
2 0  
Fleet."l6 In response to this situation the Italians 
required a capability that could cheaply ,and quickly reduce 
the number of units ranged against them. MIW provided the 
Italians with a solution that over time would become the 
sole offensive arm of the Royal Italian Navy (RMI/Regia 
M a r i n a ) .  
In order to meet the challenge, the Italians 
experimented with a wide variety of MIW concepts and became 
particularly effective in their use of combat swimmers and 
human torpedoes17 to attack ships at anchor. The emphasis 
the Italians placed on these types of operations can be seen 
in the sophistication of their organization. The Decima Mas 
was organized into two distinct parts, ". . .a surface group 
and a sub-surface weapons group. The former dealt with the 
operation of the fast explosive motor boats and the latter 
l6 Paul Kemp, Underwater W a r r i o r s  (Annapolis MD: The Naval 
Institute Press, 1996) , 23. 
l7 Human torpedo refers to the "wet" two-man Maiale  ( S i l u r o  
a L e n t a  Corsa )  mini-submarine. The Maid le  was similar in 
size and shape to a conventional torpedo. The two-man crew 
sat astride the craft with closed circuit dive gear and the 
forward operator controlling the direction and ballast of 
the craft with a joystick. At a speed of 4.5 knots the 
Maia le  had a range of 4 miles and at 2.3 knots a range of 15 
miles. Upon reaching a target, the operators would remove 
and attach the 220kg-300kg warhead located at the front of 
the craft, then exfiltrate the target area with their 
submersible. 
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with human torpedoes and assault frogmen. "I8 Both groups 
were effective during the war. Although the groups were 
separate and could conduct operations independently, as with 
the successful human torpedo attack on Alexandria in 
December 1941, they could also be quickly reconstituted for 
combined attacks, as witnessed during the ill-fated surface 
and sub-surface attack on Malta in July 1941. 
In addition to the l o t h  Light Flotilla's advanced 
organizational structure was an equally impressive support 
component. For transiting to and from targets, the Italians 
quickly adopted the practice of using specially configured 
conventional submarines. Pressure-tight containers attached 
to the submarine's casing allowed Italian frogmen to 
transport their human torpedoes and MTB19 boats without 
being exposed to the elements. Initially, on arriving at a 
pre-arranged drop-off point, the submarine would surface and 
the naval commandos would quickly remove and launch their 
assault craft. Later, the Italians developed an entry/exit 
method that allowed them to launch and recover while the 
l8 Kemp, Underwater  W a r r i o r s ,  24. 
1 9  The l o t h  Light Flotilla utilized several different 
configurations of Motor Touring (Motorscafo T u r i s m o )  boats 
(MTB). These were high-speed platforms, 30-33ktsI with a 
crew of 1-2 men designed to attack ships by launching 
torpedoes, or impacting and then detonating on contact. 
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submarine remained submerged, greatly reducing the 
submarine's vulnerability. 
Along with highly trained personnel and specially 
designed submarines, the l o t h  Light Flotilla also employed 
specially configured surface vessels to act as "mothercraft" 
for launching and recovering from missions. A s  an example of 
the Italians level of sophistication, for attacks on the 
British Fleet anchored at Gibraltar, the l o t h  Light Flotilla 
launched Gamma assault frogmen20 and Maiale operations from 
a derelict Italian tanker, the Olterra, laying close by at 
Algeciras. Scuttled by its Italian crew at the outbreak of 
the war, the Olterra was refloated by the neutral Spanish, 
and subtly remanned by a detachment from the Decima Mas. The 
Olterra, because of its proximity to Gibraltar, served as an 
ideal staging base for attacks. on the British Fleet. The 
Decima Mas detachment reconfigured the Olterra into a 
floating support base complete with all the tools necessary 
to maintain several human torpedoes and a submerged trapdoor 
for launching and recovering frogmen unobserved. 
2O Gamma assault frogmen, or combat swimmers, were equipped 
with Belloni dive suits and closed circuit breathing 
apparatus. Their primary mission was to penetrate harbors 
undetected and then attach limpet mines to enemy ships in 
port. 
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The balanced and integrated approach used by the 
Italians offers a modern l o o k  at MIW’s f u l l  potential. By 
bringing together MTB high speed surface attacks, Gamma 
assault frogmen, wet and dry mini-submarines, and the 
appropriate conventional craft to support these operations, 
the Italians were able to deploy a potent unconventional 
response to the Allies conventional superiority in the 
Mediterranean. The l o t h  Light Flotilla also continued to 
push the boundaries of MIW by innovating radically new 
techniques and capitalizing on cutting edge technologies. By 
the end of the war the Decima Mas record was impressive, “in 
under three years of warfare, the Decima Mas was responsible 
for sinking or damaging four warships and twenty-seven 
merchant ships totaling 265,352 tons in operations ranging 
from Alexandria to Gibraltar. r r 2 1  
It is because of these types of successes that, by the 
end of the Second World War, some element of MIW whether in 
the form of high-speed boats, mini-submarines, or naval 
commandos, had been utilized by every major navy involved in 
the war. MIW units continued to demonstrate the ability to 
influence naval affairs while realizing disproportionately 
large results in relation to their size. Technology, 
21 Kemp, Underwater Warriors, 22. 
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initiative, and forward thinking had allowed men dedicated 
to the irregular approach the opportunity to exploit the 
advantages offered by maritime irregular warfare operations. 
In the process this enabled innovative MIW units to affect 
the naval balance and the course of conflict both at sea, 
and ashore. 
Since the end of World War 11, maritime irregular 
warfare has continued to be routinely employed around the 
globe. For example, elements of the unconventional approach 
to naval warfare have been utilized in the Korean War, the 
Second Indochina War (1965-19731, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and 
most recently in the Persian Gulf War. Maritime irregular 
warfare has also played an important role in many of the 
less publicized and smaller confrontations that have 
characterized the later half of the twentieth century. 
Examples of MIW used in this context occurred during the 
1982 Falklands War, Eritrea's thirty-year fight for 
independence from Ethiopia, and the current terrorist- 
insurgent campaign being carried out in Sri Lanka by Tamil 
separatists. In addition to these must be added MIW's many 
peacetime applications. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union used sophisticated MIW related tools and 
techniques as a means of collecting information on one 
another during the Cold War. North Korea's use of midget 
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submarines and specially configured merchant marine vessels 
to infiltrate South Korea and Japan is a well-documented, 
and continuing, threat.22 Other, less obvious uses of the 
indirect approach at sea include very sophisticated 
entrepreneurial forms of MIW best illustrated by maritime 
piracy and the maritime components of the drug trade. Today, 
the MIW concept continues to be called upon to fill a 
variety of traditional and nontraditional functions. In the 
process, both conventionally trained sailors and common 
criminals have exploited the advantages and opportunities 
that MIW and the indirect approach afford. Although much of 
the equipment and many of the tactics have evolved over the 
years, the inherent qualities that make MIW effective are as 
relevant today as they were fifty years ago. 
B. CURRENT TRENDS IN MARITIBE IRREGULAR WARFARE 
In general, over the past fifty years the types of 
operations MIW forces have performed throughout the oceans, 
seas and inland waters of the world remain relatively 
consistent. Naval guerrillas still rely on individually 
22 Reference Joseph Bermudez, DPRK Seaborne I n f i l t r a t i o n  
Operat ions:  June-December 1998,  available from 
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/bermudezOlO799.html, and 
Richard Sharpe, ed. , Jane’s Fighting Ships: 1999-2000, 
(Jane‘s Information Group Inc, 1999)’ 405 for information on 
DPRK auxiliary vessels and 401 for information on Yugo and 
P-4 midget submarine design characteristics capabilities. 
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equipped combat swimmers or unconventional submarine 
platforms for subsurface attacks on shipping and for 
infiltrating forces ashore. Small, high-speed boats in the 
same tradition of the World War I1 PT boats continue to 
offer surface mobility, insertion, and interdiction 
functions. To this day naval commandos fully dedicated to 
conducting maritime special operations still conduct 
amphibious raids, unconventional warfare, and clandestine 
reconnaissance operations in the littorals. In addition to 
being able to conduct operations on land or at sea, MIW has 
also incorporated some elements of aviation in order to 
rapidly deliver assets and/or forces. This capability has 
greatly extended MIW' s operational reach and provided 
additional flexibility for the application of the indirect 
approach to naval warfare. Within each of the three mediums 
that MIW operates, sea-air-land, the most modern MIW related 
concepts currently being employed need to be briefly 
examined in order to firmly fix MIW's position in naval 
affairs. These current trends may provide valuable insight 
into the general direction MIW is heading and the kinds of 




1. Mastering the Sea, Air, and Land 
Today, maritime irregular warfare is as committed to 
the fundamental need to accelerate the shoot, move, and 
communicate cycle as any modern form of warfare. With the 
aid of technological advancements MIW has taken major 
evolutionary steps toward better mastery of the sea-air-land 
mediums, and especially in the littorals where those three 
mediums converge. Currently, two trends appear to be 
dominating maritime irregular warfare thinking. 
a) Multi-Medium Capabilities 
The ability to operate seamlessly throughout naval 
warfare’s three different mediums has been one hallmark of 
the MIW operations. In the age of sail this trend was 
characterized by unconventional operations that combined the 
use of sea and land forces to achieve objectives. In modern 
times land and sea operations have been joined by subsurface 
and air operations as technological advances have allowed 
MIW to adapt and expand into all aspects of the naval 
environment. Today, MIW forces continue to try and field 
more efficient and effective multi-medium capabilities in 
order to increase the total number of options available to 
planners opting for an unconventional solution. 
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The term multi-medium capability describes the 
ability to utilize the three different mediums that enclose 
naval warfare, sea-air-land, through different combinations 
of assets. World War I1 provides an example of this trend 
when the Italian l o t h  Light Flotilla used specially 
configured submarines as mothercraft to launch MTB's for 
surface attacks on Allied shipping. Another example of this 
capability could take the form of using an aircraft to 
deliver a surface asset close to an intended target by air- 
dropping a small, high-speed boat and complement of 
personnel at sea. This surface asset could then be used to 
infiltrate the target area and insert a small force ashore 
for an offensive operation or scouting mission. This unique 
multi-medium capability allows MIW to be extremely flexible 
by being tailored to the task. Air delivery systems give MIW 
forces the ability to operate at extended ranges and within 
condensed timelines. Unconventional surface or subsurface 
infiltratlon reduces the chances of early detection. The 
flexibillzy of sending a small force ashore in an unorthodox 
manner thus allows MIW forces to insert when and where they 
are least expected. 
When the individual capabilities MIW has developed 
overtime are appropriate for the situation and sequenced 
correctly the measurable impact and probability of success 
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have proven to increase dramatically. This allows MIW to be 
more operationally dynamic, and capabilities to be packaged 
in the form of a distributed, vice focused, threat that is 
much harder to counter. In modern times, the number of 
different variations on.this theme, ranging from on or below 
the surface of the water, air delivery capabilities, and MIW 
operations ashore, has allowed MIW to master the naval 
environment with the same ubiquitous presence that Sir 
Francis Drake displayed in the 16th century. 
b) Hybrid Platforms 
Maritime irregular warfare’s desire to exploit 
every aspect of its operating environment has in turn also 
given rise to a new generation of hybrid platforms. These 
platforms come in an infinite number of shapes and sizes and 
offer an equally diverse number of capabilities that make it 
easier for MIW forces to mount effective unconventional 
operations. This thesis will divide the different types of 
hybrid platforms into three general categories. 
First, perhaps the most sophisticated of the 
hybrid platforms are those that can transition between 
mediums during operations. One example of this type of 
hybrid platform is the North Korean high-speed infiltration 
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craft (HSIC/PBF) .23 At a length of 12.8m and a top surface 
speed of roughly 45kt, the HSIC is similar in appearance to 
a small surface craft. "Large numbers [were]  built for Agent 
infiltration and covert operations. These craft have a very 
low radar cross-section and 'squat' at high speeds.. . [In 
a d d i t i o n ,  is alleged to be able to submerge to a 
depth of 3m using a snort mast, and to propel dived at 
4 kt . "24 
the HSIC] 
Although crude in comparison to similar platforms 
developed by wealthier nations, the HSIC does provide an 
excellent example of the drift within MIW towards hybrid 
platforms capable of transitioning from one form of 
operation to another. Illustrated in this example by the 
HSIC's ability to transition directly and uninterrupted from 
surface operations to subsurface operations. The HSIC 
example also proves that these innovations do not reside 
solely in the domain of the premier navies. In order to 
avoid detection South American drug cartels looking for new 
ways to smuggle their product into the United States have 
2 3  Sharpe, Jane's Fight ing Ships:  1999-2000,  412. 
24 I b i d . ,  412 
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also utilized a vessel with similar design features,25 in 
addition to experimenting with sophisticated mini- 
submarines.26 Additionally, if MIW is to maintain mastery of 
the littorals it will require improved coastal and 
hinterland mobility. This need could spawn a family of light 
vehicles capable of directly transitioning from sea to land 
operations and offers another example of the trend towards 
fielding more capable hybrid platforms. 
Another variation of the hybrid concept that has 
already been alluded to but needs further explanation 
involves configuring larger conventional platforms to 
support and launch smaller MIW assets. Since World War 11, 
conventional submarines have had the ability to launch and 
recover smaller mini-submarines while remaining submerged. 
Additionally, surface vessels with conventional design 
characteristics continue to adapt to the primary role of 
delivering smaller unconventional assets. These types of 
operations allow MIW forces to operate at extended ranges, 
for longer  durations and represent another distinct family 
25 R e f e r o n c s  Jane's Defense Weekly available at 
http://jaw.janes.com for information on low profile maritime 
drug smuggling platforms called, "Super Smugglers." 
26 New York Times Company, 210 Miles From Pacific Ocean, 
Drug Smugglers Try to Build Sub, The New York Times, 8 
September 2000, late edition (east coast). 
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of hybrid platforms currently in inventory and designed 
specifically for conducting MIW operations. 
One final variation of the hybrid concept needs to 
be briefly identified. Not all practitioners of MIW can 
field state-of-the-art equipment and capabilities. This fact 
has led some groups to pursue alternative paths to increased 
capabilities through the development of hybrid platforms 
produced by combining existing technologies. During 
Eritrea's thirty-year fight for independence from Ethiopia, 
the Eritirean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) successfully 
deployed this type of hybrid platform and a very effective 
M I W  strategy against the Ethiopian Navy.27 The EPLF's high- 
speed gunboat was fashioned by mounting a twin 20mm anti- 
aircraft weapon on a 20ft fiberglass hull powered by dual 
outboard engines. These boats were then used along the coast 
for interdiction operations and to support small raids 
ashore. Unable to purchase MIW specific systems the EPLF 
combined readily available and low-cost civilian boat hulls 
with crew served weapons captured in the field from the 
Ethiopian Army. Although the types of weapons mounted in 
27 For information on Eritrea's thirty-year fight for 
independence see Dan Connell, A g a i n s t  A l l  Odds: A Chronicle 
of the E r i t r e a n  R e v o l u t i o n  (Red Sea Press, 1993), and 
Christopher Clapham, ed., A f r i c a n  G u e r r i l l a s  (Indiana 
University Press, 1998). 
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each boat varied the EPLF was able to develop a rugged, 
reliable, and very capable unconventional platform by 
combining existing off-the-shelf components with other 
weapon systems on hand. Individually none of the systems 
that went into building this platform could be classified as 
state-of-the-art. It was the end product and the way in 
which it was employed that made the EPLF’s hybrid gunboat 
cutting edge. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranians 
deployed a very similar unconventional high-speed 
C. LINKING THE REGULAR AND IRREGULAR APPROACH 
In order to gain a complete understanding of the MIW 
concept and tie together the various forms it has taken over 
time, the overarching themes that guide MIW must be clearly 
identified. In the previous sections the advantages of MIW 
were discussed and many elements inherent to MIW operations 
were highlighted. Each of these points plays an important 
role in the overall understanding of the maritime irregular 
warfare concept. Although the points brought out in the 
typology form the foundation on which MIW stands, the sheer 
28 Reference Jane’s Intelligence Review, The Tanker  War, 
Jane‘s Information Group Limited, 1 May 1992, for 
information about Iranian Boghammer operations during the 
Iran-Iraq War and Sharpe, Jane’s F i g h t i n g  Ships:  1999-2000,  
3 2 9  for design characteristics and capabilities. 
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diversity found in the irregular approach to naval warfare 
precludes the use of these elements as a way of tying the 
MIW concept together. Instead, two broader, overarching 
themes must be derived from the typology that take into 
account these points while continuing to simplify MIW 
conceptually. 
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the approach 
this thesis has taken to arrive at an explanation of the MIW 
concept. Due to MIW’s diversity and range, a precisely 
worded definition or list of principles that collectively 
define the MIW concept is impossible to produce. MIW is a 
concept that must be gradually distilled from numerous 
sources. This process begins at the lower level of the MIW 
pyramid formed by the MIW typology. 
The advantages of MIW and the various elements of MIW 
brought out in that discussion form the foundation for 
understanding the MIW concept. This step-by-step process 
continues by bringing MIW up to date and examining its 
current global posture and direction. The corollary 
hypothesis discussed below will further refine MIW 
conceptually. When these three levels of the MIW pyramid are 
taken together and combined, a clearer understanding of the 
MIW concept begins to emerge. 
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Figure 2. The Maritime Irregular Warfare Pyramid 
The tight linkage and interplay between MIW and 
conventional naval warfare is a critical part of the MIW 
concept. This interdependent relationship is actually 
comprised of two key parts. The first is that, when the 
typology is taken as a whole, it becomes obvious that right 
alongside the evolution in conventional naval warfare, comes 
progress and advancement in the unconventional sphere. This 
point is most easily understood by realizing that the 
continuous advancements in conventional naval warfare have 
been aimed at gaining an increased capability or naval 
advantage. This increased capability has the effect of 
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forcing opponents, or competitors, to meet these new 
challenges by exploring new, unorthodox avenues of attack 
and accelerating the rise of the irregular approach. At the 
same time, these advances in technology and capability have 
increasingly led to the need for specially trained personnel 
and equipment to fulfill the MIW requirement. This 
relationship suggests that advance in the conventional 
sphere leads directly to opportunity and advancement in the 
unconventional sphere as new weapons become vulnerable, and 
new operational methods enable the employment of the 
indirect approach. 
The second part of this interdependent relationship 
between the regular and irregular forms of naval warfare 
concerns the bond linking MIW directly to sea power. MIW has 
consistently been employed, either independently or as an 
integrated part of regular naval warfare strategies, as a 
means of projecting sea power and gaining sea control. 
Depending on the location and particular situation, sea 
control can be a prerequisite for larger strategies 
involving land-based objectives. When thinking about the 
advantages of MIW this is the area that readily comes to 
mind, and historically this is the arena in which MIW has 
proven its worth. The offensive nature of naval warfare and 
the need for decisive operations to gain sea control for the 
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most part determine the character of MIW operations .29 The 
role of the Italian loth Light Flotilla during World War I1 
is an outstanding example of a sophisticated MIW 
organization designed specifically around the idea of 
gaining control of the sea, or alternatively, for negating 
the Allies absolute control of the sea through 
unconventional sea denial operations. Offensively oriented, 
Decima Mas offered Italy a low-cost and effective 
alternative for challenging the Allies conventional 
superiority in the Mediterranean. 30 One point of contention 
brought out in the typology is that MIW can affect conflict 
both at sea and ashore. When properly employed, MIW has 
proven to possess this dual potential. The point being made 
here is that the primary linkages that support MIW and tie 
it into a cohesive military strategy extends directly to sea 
power and control of the sea. 
29 Wayne Hughes, Fleet T a c t i c s  and Coas ta l  Combat (Naval 
Institute Press, 2 0 0 0 ) .  
30 Although MIW operations are primarily offensive in nature 
as this passage points out, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) are currently using a strategically defensive 
MIW strategy spearheaded by small, fast gunboats and an 
amphibious raiding capability to maintained control over the 
Jaffna Peninsula and counter the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) in 
the north. While tactically offensive, it is important to 
point out  that MIW can be used defensively at the strategic 
level. Reference: Rohan Gunaratna, S r i  Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis 
and N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  (Colombo: South Asian Network on 
Conflict Research, 1998). 
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Additionally, this relationship suggests that MIW 
operations be tightly connected to the water and the 
exploitation of the water flank as a means of gaining 
advantage and achieving objectives. This goes far beyond the 
use of water simply as an avenue of approach or convenient 
escape route. In this heightened sense, water becomes MIW' s 
primary enabler and operational center of gravity. These 
fundamental points shape the interdependent relationship 
between the regular and irregular approach, and together 
comprise an overarching theme that is consistently found in 
maritime irregular warfare operations. 
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111. INFORMATION AGE CONFLICT 
There is no single answer to the many challenges 
that will present themselves in the future, naval  
forces3z will have to adapt as they have done 
throughout history to changing circumstances . . .  At 
the same time, the fact that the future is 
uncertain is no excuse for failing to make 
adequate preparations. 
- Operat ional  Maneuver From T h e  Sea 
A. THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
In order to develop a viable vision of MIW's future, 
the coming trends in information age conflict must be 
identified in a clear and simplified manner that adds value, 
and remains relevant, to the overall discussion. This 
chapter approaches the future of warfare's inherent 
complexities by combining the insights and analysis of 
existing research in an analytical framework for presenting 
crisis, conflict, and war in the information age. In 
developing this general vision the most widely accepted 
categories for interpreting the future of warfare will be 
used in order to build an accurate and realistic framework. 
This chapter will then derive an alternative, evolutionary 
based interpretation that may offer a more powerful 
31 Emphasis added. 
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perspective of information age conflict in the early decades 
of the twenty-first century. 
B. BACKGROUND AND BASIC APPROACH 
A vast literature dedicated to thinking about the 
future of warfare already exists.32 Because of the depth of 
this existing literature, this chapter essentially provides 
a condensed stocktaking of the most relevant concepts and 
themes consistently found throughout this rich body of work. 
As previously stated the primary goal of this chapter is to 
synthesize the core concepts found in the existing 
literature into a clearly defined, and useable, framework 
for interpreting information age conflict. The points with 
MIW relevance developed using this framework will then serve . 
to inform the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
The “conflict in the information age” framework will be 
limited to identifying broader, overarching issues, and will 
be presented in essentially an outline format comprised of 
32 e.g. Bevin Alexander, The F u t u r e  o f  Warfare  (New York NY:  
W.W. Norton and Company, 1995)’ John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 
1997), George and Meredith Friedman, The Future  o f  War (New 
York NY: Crown Publishers, 1996), Robert Pfaltzgraff and 
Richard Shultz, eds., War i n  the I n f o r m a t i o n  Age (Duller VA: 
Brassey’s Books, 1997)’ Robert Scales, Future  War fare  
(Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999), and 
Martin Van Creveld, The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of War (New York NY: 
The Free Press, 1991), etc. 
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three primary components: 1) the emerging geostrategic 
setting; 2) the revolution in military affairs (RMA) ;  and 
finally, tactical technology trends (T3). Figure 3 offers a 
graphic representation of the framework's three primary 
components, and the interdependent relationships currently 
being forged by advances in information technology. 




Figure 3. Conflict in the Information Age Framework 
Approaching the subject in this manner offers two 
distinct advantages. First, the themes developed in this 
chapter have purposefully been chosen because of their 
timeless and dynamic qualities that avoid built-in 
obsolescence or the construction of a brittle and narrowly 
focused framework. Ultimately, in order for any framework to 
be effective it must be able to handle tough tests by being 
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flexible enough to adjust for extreme cases, and/or 
potential wild card scenarios. And second, concentrating on 
the broader overarching themes and their linkages eliminates 
the need for a static, laundry list of topics with limited 
applicability and no long-term strategic value. 
Prior to beginning this analysis some important issues 
and assumptions need to be isolated in order to shape the 
context, and define the limits, of the following discussion: 
1. This thesis begins by recognizing that, “In the absence 
of a relatively fixed, strategic environment, we are 
faced with a far more complex world that defies 
authoritative forecasts of the future.”33 
2. There is no single answer to crises, conflict and war in 
the future. This point and the preceding point are 
complementary, and the volume of material that attempts 
to make sense of the future of warfare supports this 
notion. Instead this thesis acknowledges that, ”we are in 
a period of great transition. The changes experienced in 
the few years following the end of the Cold War will 
likely continue. In their wake will follow crises, 
conflict, and war. ”34 
3. This thesis focuses on, but is not limited to, the near- 
term future. The reason for choosing this benchmark is so 
that the intellectual beacon can be placed far enough in 
front of the pace of change to avoid being constricted by 
the current environment. 
4. The framework developed in this chapter acts only as an 
outline for simplifying and organizing critical 
environmental variables. The strength of the framework is 
33 Training and Doctrine Command ( T R A D O C ) ,  Pam 525-5, 
available from http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525- 
5.htm, Aug 1994, 1. 
34 I b i d . ,  2 .  
44  
its ability to break the subject down into its component 
parts for closer scrutiny, and its ability to remain 
flexible and adjust for rapid changes and environmental 
uncertainty. 
C. THE EMERGING GEOSTRATEGIC SETTING 
Crisis, conflict, and war do not take place in a 
vacuum, but within a constantly evolving geopolitical 
framework that provides focus and intensity. In order to 
understand the trends in information age conflict we must 
first try to make sense of the broader arena in which these 
actions take place. This dictates that forecasting the 
emerging geostrategic setting form the first step in any 
investigation into the future of warfare. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union the 
relatively fixed bi-polar strategic environment that 
characterized the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar, 
regionally focused, international security system that is 
far more complex.35 Concurrently, the acceleration and 
35 This thesis recognizes that while the U.S. is currently 
the only superpower in the world, history teaches this 
enviable position is unlikely to be permanent. While the 
U.S. will retain its mantle of leadership into the near 
future, that leadership position will become increasingly 
complex and more difficult to maintain due to the probable 
rise of one or more major regional competitors. Although the 
exact form these competitors will take remains unclear, and 
no mirror image peer competitor to the U.S. is expected to 
emerge, major competitors will acquire the ability to 
challenge U.S. interests regionally, and to a selective 
degree, globally. This thesis argues that "multi-polar" is 
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diffusion of advanced technologies and weapons continue to 
fundamentally alter and reshape the world around us. 
Together these two critical events have combined to produce 
a geostrategic setting in flux as it transitions from the 
industrial age of the twentieth century into the information 
of the twenty-first century. 
Clouded by this environmental uncertainty, the future 
of warfare remains difficult to project. Nevertheless, 
countless futurists have tried to predict the general 
parameters of the twenty-first century. 
One is a vision of the future devoid of major war 
- a century of peace. This school argues that due 
to an expanded number of democratic states, shared 
understanding - through advances in information 
technology, and global economic interdependence, 
we are entering a new era where War is no longer 
deemed a productive means of pursuing strategic 
objectives. Even if history proves this prediction 
correct, it will also show that the transition 
from the world’s bloodiest century to one of 
relative peace was not smooth.36 
In fact this rosy vision of the future may ignore a 
fundamental truth consistently found in the past. As the 
world’s geopolitical framework continues to undergo 
fundamental restructuring accompanied by dramatic 
alterations across the technical, societal, economic, 
the most accurate description of the emerging geostrategic 
setting. 
36 I b i d . ,  5 .  
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religious, cultural, and physical spectrum, history teaches 
that change of this magnitude and intensity serves to 
increase global tension and instability. Far from reaching 
the "century of peace," the geostrategic cycle can be 
thought of as having merely reached the uncertain, and 
momentary, plateau that usually precedes any major shift in 
the strategic landscape. At the very least, it should be 
noted that, "the types of crises and conflicts we have 
experienced since the end of the Cold War will likely 
continue into the early decades of the twenty-first 
A brief discussion of the two primary forces at 
work in the operating environment is offered in order to 
further break out and clarify the emerging geostrategic 
set t ing . 
1. The Geostrategic Reordering 
Current sources of conflict - ethnic rivalries, 
nationalism, religion-based antagonisms, and 
competition for scarce economic resources, 
including water - will continue and perhaps 
intensify. Transnational threats such as 
international crime syndicates, terrorist 
networks, and drug cartels also have the potential 
to grow in strength and influence, presenting 
security problems that are significantly different 
from those of the past in terms of scope and 
quality. A higher incidence of failed states, 
coupled with the aforementioned sources of 
conflict and unpredictable natural and human- 
induced disasters, will likely lead to a rise in 
37 I b i d . ,  1. 
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regional instability. Maintaining international 
stability will probably require a higher frequency 
of action by the international community.38 
A large proportion of the outside literature dedicated 
to interpreting the future of warfare, and all of the 
current pro] ects supported by the Department of Defense 
(DOD), paint a picture of the emerging geostrategic setting 
similar to the one presented here.39 Accepting this basic 
outline, this excerpt provides the necessary information, 
and sufficient depth of analysis, to identify the major 
fault lines emerging in the geostrategic setting. In 
particular, the simultaneous increase in the number of 
internal breakdowns and the rise of aggressive non-state 
threats,40 two trends that ultimately feed off of one 
another, appear to be driving the geostrategic reordering. 
To begin with, although this compressed view of the 
future does possess elements of significant change, it is 
important to highlight the fact that it also suggests many 
fundamental aspects will remain essentially unchanged during 
38 Army A f t e r  N e x t  (AAN) Annual Report FY98, 1 9 9 8 ,  1. 
39 e.g. The Army After Next @AN), . . .From The Sea, 
Operational Maneuver From The Sea, Global Reach, Global 
Power, Army Vision 2010. 
40 Although the term "transnational" threat is referenced 
this thesis applies a broader term, non-state threat, in 
order to encompass transnational, subnational, and anational 
threats. 
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the timeframe in question. This translates into continued 
activity throughout the low-intensity spectrum and in other 
forms of conflict below the conventional threshold. All 
told, the current sources of crisis, conflict, and war and 
their many variations do not appear to be receding through 
the thirty-year mark. 
Added to this already volatile mixture is the rise of 
non-state threats. Several authors have even taken this 
general vision of the future a step further by suggesting 
that it represents the beginn'ing of a new, "bif~rcated"~~ 
international system no longer dominated by the state- 
centered paradigm. This new bifurcated system they identify 
is comprised primarily of the traditional state-centered 
paradigm, while recognizing the presence of a potentially 
destabilizing non-state stratum made up of international 
crime organizations, ethnic/religious separatists, and 
transnational terrorist organizations. This school of 
thought points out the fact that, "the Clausewitzian 
t r i n i t a r i a n  concept of warfare - centering on the state, the 
government, and the population - has been supplemented, 
though not replaced, by a system in which the state is 
41 Pfaltzgraff & Shultz, eds., War i n  the In format ion  Age: 
New Chal lenges  for U.S. Security, 11. 
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either weakened or has disintegrated. "42 To support their 
claim these authors cite the breakup of numerous states into 
smaller newer states, increasing frequency of failed states, 
and instances in which states only maintain nominal control 
over their population, and territory. 
Clearly these new, well-organized, better-informed, and 
lethally armed non-state entities increase the complexity of 
the geostrategic landscape. This new dynamic also lends 
credence and fits nicely with the argument that in the 
future asymmetrical/asynchronous forces similar in 
appearance to these non-state threats and utilizing indirect 
methods of operation could pose a serious problem to a more 
conventionally focused adversary. When combined with the 
threat posed by the intensification of "ism's, "43 along with 
other natural and human-induced sources of conflict, these 
characteristics also have the potential to alter and reorder 
the way the geostrategic landscape has traditionally been 
viewed. 44 
42 I b i d . ,  10. 
43 i.e. Non-state threats combined with ethno-nationalism, 
terrorism, and/or religious fundamentalism. 
44 Robert Kaplan, The  Coming Anarchy, The Atlantic Monthly, 
February, 1994. 
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Superimposed on this changing geostrategic framework is 
the rapid pace of technological change. Countless 
conflicting theories have been put forward about the impact 
information technologies will have on the future of warfare. 
Collectively, the only thing these theories convey is the 
The Rapid Pace of Technological Change 
sentiment that, "Despite common acknowledgement of the 
fundamental changes in the strategic environment, little 
agreement exists about how information technologies will 
further affect it."45 
Technologically speaking, " di f f u s i on'' and 
"connectedness" are the two watchwords for the coming years. 
Interestingly, these two terms can also be related back to 
the two primary trends identified in the geostrategic 
, .  
reordering. The disintegration of the state, or the state no 
longer being needed, represents a form of diffusion while 
connectedness can be found in the ways non-state actors are 
increasingly able to reach across traditional boundaries. In 
other words, diffusion and connectedness are likely to 
change the way peoples group and not just how they 
communicate. This has major implications for the future 
45 Pfaltzgraff, & Shultz, eds., War i n  the Information Age: 
New Challenges for U.S. Security, 3 3 2 .  
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scope of war. Thought of in these terms, both actually 
define a single global phenomenon embracing the strategic 
environment. That phenomenon involves the spread of 
sophisticated information technologies along with the 
advanced information architecture linking these systems 
together. The momentum behind this phenomenon itself poses 
challenges, since both “diffusion” and “connectedness, I’ 
along with the process they help define, act as enablers for 
various forms of information warfare (IW). Here again the 
outside literature provides the best description of IW and 
its potential impact on the future. 
The increasing proliferation of information 
technology provides potential adversaries - 
whether nations, organizations, or individuals - 
with the capability to conduct increasingly 
sophisticated information operations. . .Potential 
adversaries do not need high-technology or 
strictly military systems to conduct information 
warfare. The ability to manipulate, isolate, or 
negate portions of the electromagnetic spectrum 
will be a key element of future military 
operations. Disruption of the opponent‘s ability 
to use these systems while protecting [ones] own 
will prove crucial in the future.46 
There has been a lot of speculation regarding the rise 
in information warfare because, by design, the infosphere 
has proven to be porous and prone to attack. In the high 
technology arena oftentimes 
46  Training and Doctrine Command 
1994, ch. 2,p. 6. 
the most cutting edge 
(TRADOC), Pam 525-5, AUg 
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technologies can become the most vulnerable and the easiest 
to counteract. Current events support this argument, and 
point to the emergence of new types of military strategies 
aimed at disruption and paralysis instead of the more 
traditional strategies of attrition and annihilation. In 
this heightened sense, winning by paralysis may begin to 
take on new meaning and importance in future military 
affairs. 
Because IW's full strength has not yet been put to the 
test, like many of the new concepts being generated by the 
information age, it is still an amorphous concept with no 
clearly agreed upon definition. As an example, the IW label 
has been applied to everything from non-lethal attacks on 
the civilian infrastructure, to strategic psychological 
operations, to more conventional military-against-military 
confrontations in which precision guidance and improved 
strike capabilities elevate warfare to a new level by 
dramatically increasing combat power. 
No cursory analysis can do a field as complicated and 
technical as IW justice, many books and countless articles 
have been dedicated to the subject, and still its enigmatic 
character persists. Without question, the field of IW will 
continue to experience quantum leaps in capability through 
the near-term future. While recognizing IW's importance and 
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latent potential this thesis limits the discussion to making 
a macro-level distinction between the "independent" versus 
"integrated" forms of information warfare. Limiting the 
discussion to this level of analysis avoids identifying IW 
capabilities that will be rapidly surpassed and instead 
casts IW in the role of another tool emerging in crisis, 
conflict, and war. 
Independent IW can be an alternative to war, as, 
for example, when civilian targets and information 
systems are attacked by terrorists; or it can be 
used in preemptive strikes on systems supporting 
military operations. At the same time, integrated 
IW can be viewed as part of the transformation of 
battlefield military operations, in which 
information technologies are used to support 
traditional military objectives by providing 
enhanced situational awareness for conducting 
operations, with all the attendant changes in 
organization and doctrine that this will require. 
These two kinds of IW can be conducted 
simultaneously or separately, depending on who is 
engaged in a conflict.47 
Clearly, the overall effect of technological change on 
crisis, conflict, and war will be hard to gauge. Only time 
will be able to bring the subject into better focus. Be that 
as it may, there seems to be an overwhelming consensus among 
observers that the fundamental reordering described above, 
along with other rapid advances in technology, will coalesce 
to form the backbone of the emerging geostrategic setting. 
47 Pfaltzgraff, & Shultz, eds., War i n  the Information Age: 
New Challenges for U . S .  Security, 3 3 3 .  
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Additionally, this thesis argues that the future 
geostrategic environment will become increasingly complex, 
characterized by shifting balances within regions and the 
prevalence of ad-hoc security structures, ultimately leading 
to greater instability, and increasing the likelihood of 
crisis, conflict, and war especially in areas below the 
conventional threshold of war. 
D. THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
In conjunction with the changes taking place in the 
geostrategic setting, it appears that the foundation for an 
information-based RMA is being built simultaneously. The 
vast quantity of recent literature dedicated to 
investigating the future of warfare has greatly expanded and 
clouded what is meant by the term RMA. It should once again 
be pointed out that, like IW, there is currently no clearly 
defined or widely accepted definition, and that this thesis 
does not  seek to become mired down trying to create one. 
Instead t h e  main effort will continue to focus on 
identifying the overarching trends that are consistently 
cited as products of the emerging RMA. 
Prior to identifying these trends some additional 
amplifying information is addressed in order to hone this 
chapter's use of the term RMA, and how it has been portrayed 
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in the scholarly literature to date. Additionally, a two- 
tiered approach is offered as a way to frame the subject for 
discussion, and act as a primer for interpreting the trends 
in military affairs. 
1. The RMA as a Concept 
One feature of the RMA is that/ it is currently being 
misused to describe many common evolutionary changes that 
are not revolutionary in nature. In order to put the RMA in 
its proper context it is important to be able to distinguish 
between the evolutionary and revolutionary changes in 
military affairs. This thesis relies on a very general 
distinction between the two: 
Evolution is the logical progression of an 
existing system or framework, while revolution 
connotes a fundamental break with precedent...a 
truly revolutionary strategic development alters 
perceptions of the relationship of means to ends 
and, most importantly, dictates a reformulation of 
warfighting doctrine.. .48 
This thesis sides with the scholarly literature that 
believes many of the advances currently being credited as 
proof of an RMA are in actuality merely evolutionary steps 
brought about by technological advances. Although the effect 
of these advances in technology may have an impact on 
military affairs, by themselves they will not lead to a RMA 
48 Arquilla, & Ronfeldt, eds., In  A t h e n a ’ s  Camp: P r e p a r i n g  
f o r  Conflict i n  the Information Age, 8 0 .  
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until coupled with other long-term operational and 
organizational issues. Several of these purely technology- 
based prime movers will be addressed in the tactical 
technology trends section later in the chapter. 
Almost all the participants in the RMA debate currently 
recognize that this is but the latest in a historical series 
of RMAs, and that no two RMAs are exactly alike. One thing 
past RMAs offer is an abundant amount of data and 
information upon which to reflect. With the aid of the 
historical record, and in spite of the RMA's soft 
definition, there seems to be a consensus that in general 
RMA's include four primary elements. These four constituent 
elements include, "new military technologies or systems andr 
involve complex operational and organizational issues; but 
few agree on the priority among these four elements and 
identity of the key driver (if only one exists) ."49 
Additionally, the RMA's current status continues to be 
called into question for, "while the community largely 
agrees that there is an RMA to be pursued, whether it is 
already in progress, is about to start, or is mature and 
about to end all have adherents. "5O 
49  Ib id . ,  99 .  
50 Ib id . ,  1 0 0 .  
57 
This thesis maintains that with the aid of advanced 
information technologies the RMA is currently in its initial 
stages of development and that the final outcome lies 
somewhere in the future. Concurrently, this chapter will 
suggest that while a RMA may be attainable within the next 
thirty years, a two-tiered approach is needed in order to 
organize the RMA's four elements and make sense of the rapid 
changes taking place in military affairs. 
2. 
The two-tiered approach begins by accepting at face 
value the four constituent traits commonly found in past 
RMA's and then proceeds to separate those traits with a 
greater near-term effect from those with a greater long-term 
effect. Doing so emphasizes the fact that a RMA is not a 
single discrete event but a process that develops over time. 
A Two-tiered Approach to the RMA 
a )  The N e a r - T e r m  P h a s e  
The near-term phase of the present RMA centers on 
its first t w o  variables, technologies and evolving military 
systems. These are the types of military advances that are 
the closest at hand and the easiest to grasp conceptually. 
They are chzracterized, "by the technologies demonstrated 
during the Gulf War: stealth, precision weapons, advanced 
sensors, C41, and the use of real-time (or near-real-time) 
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space systems."51 Some proponents argue that, together, 
advances in these two fields are capable of producing an 
outright RMA. And in their defense, purely technology-driven 
RMA's, although rare, have been cited in the past. The 
fundamental changes in warfare that followed the 
introduction of the longbow and gunpowder are the two 
commonly cited examples of such RMA's. Presently this is the 
area that has dominated most people's understanding of the 
RMA and led to the perception that RMA's are primarily 
technology-driven events. It should be pointed out that a 
majority of the literature reviewed does not share this 
myopic interpretation. Although technologies and evolving 
military systems will bring new forces to bear within 
military affairs, most doubt that by themselves they will 
achieve a fundamental break with tradition or the "order of 
magnitude or more" increase in military effectiveness most 
point to as a litmus test for measuring RMA's.  Other 
detractors of this view also point out the fact that merely 
inserting advanced technologies into existing systems and 
organizational structures, which is currently what occurs, 
ignores the crucial third and fourth RMA variables and can 
actually introduce inefficiencies into military operations 
51 I b i d . ,  124. 
59 
creating additional uncertainty. Referring to this situation 
most involved in the RtW debate tend to advance the argument 
that, “technology alone is not sufficient to produce a 
military revolution; how military organizations adapt and 
shape new technology, military systems, and operational 
concepts is much more important.”5* 
b) T h e  Long-Term P h a s e  
The long-term phase is encapsulated in the idea 
that “concepts are stronger than tools, “ and therefore 
focuses on the last two variables commonly attributed to the 
RMA: namely, operational innovation and organizational 
adaptation. It would appear from the literature that this is 
the area that holds the key to any future RMA, meanwhile 
there is still considerable debate about when, and if, this 
phase can even be reached. While there has been tangible 
evidence of progress in the near-term phase of the RMA, real 
progress in the long-term arena has yet to materialize 
outside of isolated, and rigidly controlled, 
e~perimentation.~~ Many involved in the RMA debate still 
contend that until the technologically based near-term 
s2 I b i d . ,  81. 
53 e.g. Advanced warfighting experiments like Sea Dragon, 
Quantum Leap, Force XXI. 
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advances are translated into operational and organizational 
terms, the RMA will remain incomplete. 
This project does not have the space necessary to 
engage in the organizational jiu-jitsu, or cover the endless 
number of wire diagram permutations, needed to explain the 
shift away from hierarchical structures towards flatter, 
non-hierarchical structures that can result in increased 
information flows. Nor is it necessary for this thesis' 
purposes to list all the different forms operational 
innovation could take. That level of analysis is not 
necessary for identifying the trends in military affairs 
this thesis is focused on. Suffice it to say the exact 
nature of these long-term advances in the operational and 
organizational sphere remains hazy and inchoate at best. 
However, together with the near-term variables and the 
arguments presented in the geostrategic setting section, 
some distinct trends in military affairs are emerging that 
help t i e  together the RMA's four variables and summarize the 
RMA debate for the timeframe in question. 
3. The Trends in Military Affairs 
From the contemporary RMA debate it appears that 
several identifiable trends are emerging in military 
affairs. The points made here serve only to illuminate the 
general direction crisis, conflict, and war is taking in the 
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information age, not to indicate an absolute direction. 
These trends are classified into two separate categories and 
are again defined using broad strokes. 
a) The High-technology Trends 
One hallmark of past RMA's has been the continuing 
expansion of the arena in which conflict takes place, 
commonly referred to now as the battlespace. As military 
platforms, the submarine and the airplane both added two new 
dimensions to warfare and are classic examples of this 
historical phenomenon. Today, elements of an expanding 
battlespace are being identified as well. For example, 
in the emerging RMA, long-range precision strike 
and the information aspects of war will 
fundamentally transform war on land, sea, and in 
the air, while adding two new warfare areas: space 
warfare and information warfare, both independent 
and integrated. The common theme will be the 
overlapping of ' battlespace and 
multidimensionality, creating integrated air, 
land, sea, space, and information operations.54 
Although we cannot definitively predict the exact 
direction a future conflict might take, we can certainly 
expect to witness a significant broadening of the 
battlespace in these two general areas. As with previous 
expansion in the battlespace, this one will also lead to the 
54 Pfaltzgraff, & Shultz, eds., War in the Information A g e :  
New Challenges for U . S .  Secuxity, 344. 
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creation of additional avenues of attack. MIW's continuing 
desire to field more efficient and effective multi-medium 
capabilities is an extension of this same basic concept. 
Another subject of the current RMA centers on the 
idea of battlespace transparency. Advocates of its potential 
posit that, "the emerging RMA will create a transparent 
battlefield in which commanders, and even troops in field 
units, will be able to see the whole battlespace in real 
time. n55 The creation of greater battlespace transparency 
has also been referred to as improved situational awareness. 
And it should be stressed that although this may serve as a 
useful goal to strive for, achieving total and continuous 
situational awareness in war is highly unlikely. As numerous 
authors like to point out, the principles of chance, 
friction, and the "fog of war," all complex human driven 
phenomena, will not be negated by a simple engineering 
solution. Additionally, "low-technology adversaries likely 
to be encountered in OOTW56 may be able to develop indirect 
methods of aggression that circumvent [these] 
capabilities."57 Here again it can be said that along with 
~~ 
55 I b i d . ,  344-345. 
56 Operations Other Than War (OOTW) . 
57 I b i d . ,  345. 
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many advantages, advanced technology always comes with 
exploitable disadvantages that observant opponents are quick 
to grasp. Regardless of the degree of situational awareness 
technology can produce, it can be assumed that warfare will 
continue to be a dynamic process that is situationally and 
opponent dependent. , 
Many commentators have combined the preceding two 
points to argue that technology is ushering in a new era of 
increased operational tempo. Those involved in this debate 
maintain that the acceleration of time, more aptly the 
ability to operate inside an opponent's decision cycle,58 
may become the deciding factor in the future by compressing 
the levels of war - the strategic, operational, and tactical 
- and delivering one of the most vital principles of war, 
the element of surprise. Optimally, as the observe phase of 
the decision cycle is radically shortened with the aid of 
advanced sensor technology, it becomes much easier to 
anticipate and react to an adversary's movements. As one 
author suggests, 
. . .  surprise may become the decisive factor in 
determining both the "course and outcome" of a 
58 This refers to Colonel John Boyd's well-known model of 
the command and control process the orient, observe, decide, 
and act (OODA) loop to discuss how effective command and 
control allows decisions to be made and acted on more 
rapidly than the enemy. 
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war; in fact, these may now be described as "a 
single phenomenon." As a result, the initial 
period may now be in effect the only period in 
future warfare. Operational campaigning under 
these circumstances must be viewed as an 
integrated, seamless process in which the time 
constraints of the individual elements are 
critical to the effectiveness of the overall 
plan.59 
b) The Highly-sophisticated Trends 
Along with the more readily identifiable trends 
being driven by advanced technology two other subtle trends 
are emerging that are less dependent on hardware. These two 
trends deal with the changing nature of command and the 
prospect of the low-tech/highly-sophisticated opponent. 
Although. these trends are usually found in between the folds 
of the high technology trends, they may actually provide 
additional insight into the nature of crisis, conflict, and 
war in the future. 
In order to take full advantage of the emerging 
technological trends the nature of command may have to 
fundamentally change as well. This is perhaps the least 
controversial area within the RMA debate, and a portion of 
this topic has already been covered in the long-term phase 
discussion. To briefly revisit the concept, many observers 
foresee military hierarchies becoming flatter, and more 
59 Arquilla, & Ronfeldt, eds. , In  A t h e n a ' s  Camp: P r e p a r i n g  
f o r  Conf l ic t  i n  the Information A g e ,  8 8 .  
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streamlined, as information is quickly passed to lower 
echelons of command. In addition, analysts predict that in 
the future commanders will rely less on set movements to 
maintain control and instead devolve greater freedom of 
action to subordinate units so they can react quickly to 
rapidly changing situations while still fulfilling the 
commander’s goals. The -key point to take away from this 
discussion is the move towards decentralized tactical 
command, with greater strategic oversight. Concurrently, in 
the best case scenario technology and the changing nature of 
command will combine to increase the lethality of the small 
unit by allowing for a better exploitation of the tactical 
situation through improved information flows and fewer 
layers of command and control. 
The second trend is better categorized as a 
constantly evolving phenomenon that poses the greatest 
threat to forces relying on high-technology advances for 
conventional superiority. This is the rise of an opponent 
using low-technology tools but a highly sophisticated, 
asymmetrical/asynchronous strategy to circumvent, blind, or 
nullify a high-tech adversary’s advantage. Most participants 
in the RMA debate are quick to caveat many technology driven 
trends with examples of the problems these types of 
opponents will present. For example observers point out that 
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by monitoring high-tech developments, low-tech competitors 
will probably be able to develop creative 
asymmetric/asynchronous strategies and employ niche 
capabilities aimed at avoiding high-tech strengths and 
capitalizing on high-tech's vulnerabilities. To complicate 
matters further, adversaries may pursue a combination of 
asymmetries, or similarly several low-tech adversaries may 
combine to create a distributed asymmetric threat. 
As more of the trends identified in the high-tech 
category begin to filter down through, and out of, the more 
advanced societies the greatest threat may not come from a 
similarly equipped foe, but from an asymmetric force aware 
of the latest technologies capabilities and limitations. Or 
more problematic still is a similarly equipped foe, clever 
and flexible enough not to use that equipment, instead 
choosing to act like a low-tech opponent. In this scenario, 
these low-tech/highly-sophisticated adversaries might not 
provide t h e  usual signatures for these systems to track or 
fit t h e  profile commonly associated with a threat. By 
utilizing odd and irregular strategies, and means, these 
types of adversaries may be able to identify pressure points 
and negate certain high-tech advantages. 
E. TACTICAL TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 
Of the crisis, conflict, and war framework’s three 
primary components, the RMA remains the most difficult to 
make sense of, or project into the future. This chapter has 
sought to clarify the main body of the RMA debate by better 
defining the use of the term and identifying the presence of 
two distinct lobes: One concentrating on near-term 
technology-driven trends, and the other centered on the more 
complex long-term operational and organizational issues that 
remain further in the future. By fusing the basic trends 
found in these t w o  areas, this section has sought to develop 
a clearer picture of the general direction military affairs 
appears to be headed in the near-term. 
Whether a full RMA can be achieved within the next 
thirty years is debatable. While it appears there has been 
real progress in many of the near-term areas, progress in 
the more critical long-term areas remains hard to identify 
or even define. Even if an information age RMA is achieved 
in the near-term, not everyone will be able to take full 
advantage of it. While pursuit of the RMA may be out of 
reach for some, the comparatively low investment trends 
addressed here may attract interest and provide an alternate 
means of achieving strategic objectives. 
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Although many aspects of the future remain indistinct, 
others have become discernible. This section attempts to 
focus greater attention on the trends emerging thanks to 
enhanced warfighting tools and tactics. In the absence of 
the RMA' s long-term variables, these trends combined with 
those already identified in the near-term RMA phase, and 
those in the geostrategic setting, may offer a hedged view 
of crisis, conflict, and war in the information age. 
One particularly strong trend has been the global push 
towards establishing the primacy of precision. The shift 
towards greater precision, and the resulting trends that are 
a consequence of that shift, lie at the very heart of the 
tactical technology trends (T3) discussion. Although 
commonly associated with advanced missile technology, 
precision-guided munitions (PGM's) can come in many 
different forms and offer a wide range of capabilities. No 
one doubts that in the future precision guidance will 
continue to filter from the platform level all the way down 
to even the most basic levels of combat. A brief excerpt 
describing precision's advantages on the battlefield helps 
emphasize this trend, 
Precision ...p ermits the use of weapons that hit 
and kill only legitimate military targets, 
reducing collateral damage. It facilitates rapid, 
effective, and economical maneuver on the 
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battlefield. Precision also simplifies logistics, 
enhancing its usefulness to warfightersm60 
The effectiveness of PGM’ s has already been 
demonstrated in multiple confrontations around the globe. 
Currently, no portion of the warfare spectrum has been left 
untouched by the advantages precision guidance offers. As 
increasing numbers of PGM‘ s are made available many 
observers have postulated that their effects, either 
singularly or en masse, will enable the move towards the 
strategic coup de m a i n  operations mentioned at the end of 
the high-technology trends section. 
Another area of improved tactical performance, closely 
related to PGM’s, comes from the ability to strike targets 
at greater range. Many authors have offered examples of how 
the long-range PGM dynamic will fit into future conflicts 
and the changes that will follow in its wake. 
Future military forces will be increasingly able 
to attack concentrations of land or naval forces 
at long ranges. In such a lethal environment, 
close-combat maneuver operations will take on new 
forms. Units will need to be smaller and more 
information-intensive. Most importantly, we will 
think of the battlefield less in spatial terms, 
and r o r e  in temporal ones.61 
6o Pfaltzgraff, & Shultz, eds., War in the Information A g e :  
New Challenges for U. S .  Security,  349 .  
I b i d .  , 3 5 0 .  
7 0  
Of particular interest is the way the T3's complement 
and complete many of the thoughts already brought out in the 
previous discussions about the geostrategic setting and RMA. 
The consequences of extremely accurate standoff weapons 
moving on to the scene will have cascading effects that 
fundamentally alter the structure of future conflicts. The 
most radical change to the war paradigm appears to be the 
distortion of time caused by advanced sensor technology, the 
rapid dissemination of information, and long-range PGM's. 
Increasingly, the strategy of choice in conventional warfare 
will be to decapitate the enemy with a single, well-aimed, 
strike. As this excerpt points out, in response units will 
have to become smaller. Similarly, as the lethality of these 
small units increases due to technological advances and 
greater freedom of action, they in turn become capable of 
realizing disproportionately large results in relation to 
their size. Long-range PGM' s will threaten large 
concentrations of forces requiring that units either 
disperse or move into areas where detection becomes 
degraded. This has driven some to speculate that warfare 
will move into the cities where high-tech sensors are less 
effective. Increased interest in the art of deception may 
also gain renewed interest due to the fact that long-range 
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PGM’s have effectively decoupled the historical link between 
range and accuracy. 
Finally, along with the rise in PGM’s an alternative 
model for force modernization needs to be briefly addressed. 
This alternative model can be found by continuously adapting 
existing systems in ways that completely transform the 
original concept of the platform. The evolution of the B-52 
and its employment is an example of this trend along with 
the possible conversion of several SSBN’sS2 from their 
original nuclear deterrence role to special operations 
platforms. Additionally, the incorporation of off-the-shelf 
technology allows organizations the opportunity to keep up 
with the pace of change and/or alter and redirect existing 
systems and weapons. This alternative path to force 
modernization is especially attractive to those who do not 
have the capital to pursue high dollar upgrades. 
For those who do not have the luxury of wealth, more 
use will be made of strap-on technologies to upgrade and 
extend the life of existing systems. Information 
technologies able to link dissimilar systems together and 
provide enhanced, and decentralized, command and control 
also act as enablers for this type of force modernization. 
6* Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine. 
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In combination, the proliferation of weapons and technology 
could lead to the development of very capable, state of the 
art, hybrid forces with fewer inhibitions that are able to 
challenge the premier militaries. The Eritrean Defense 
Force’s hybrid response to naval operations during their 
thirty-year fight for independence provides a real-world 
glimpse of this concept in action. 
In conclusion, the tactical technology trends section 
has examined the more tangible, at hand, trends in military 
affairs closely related to those addressed in the near-term 
RMA discussion. The purpose of doing so has been to add 
greater depth to the conflict in the information age 
framework by identifying those enhanced warfighting tools 
and tactics currently in place in the operating environment. 
In particular, these trends have focused attention on the 
consequences of establishing the primacy of precision and 
the low-investment strategies available in the absence of a 
RMA. In doing so an alternative framework of military 
affairs in the coming decades can be developed offering a 
hedged view of information age conflict. 
F. INTERPRETING THE EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK 
Although this chapter has analyzed the trends emerging 
in all three components of the chapter’s framework, and does 
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not dismiss the possibility of a full RMA in the early 
decades of the twenty-first century, the hedged view offered 
by the evolutionary framework may provide a more realistic 
vision of crisis, conflict, and war in the near-term future. 
Figure 4 is a graphical summary of the evolutionary view 
this chapter has developed superimposed on the chapter's 
three primary components. 
Geostrategic 
Setting 
Revolution in Military 
Affairs 
*Crisis, conflict, and *Information-based RMA 
war are coming , '\ *Revolutionary or evolutionary? 
0 \  
\ RMA's 2 Lobes OGeostrategic reordering , 
Near-term 1 Long-term 
Rapid pace of 
technological change ' 
\ ' Technology I Operational & 
I *War increasingly \ 
unconventional in \\ I Organizational 
nature 1 ' J  
W i l l  they come 
together ? Tactical Techno1 Trends 
*T3 trends offer a hedg 
of the future of warfare 0 *The highly-sophisticated trends 
Greater precision at greater range 
*Low-investment trends Strategies 
gh-technology trends 
\\,' 
As yrnmetricaVAs ynchnous 
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*The conventional emphasis of the 
RMA enables the low-techhighly 
sophisticated opponent 
Figure 4 .  The Evolution in Military Affairs (EMA) 
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The major themes developed in each section are briefly 
identified and summarized. The alternate evolutionary- 
centric interpretation this chapter implicitly develops can 
be found bounded by the rectangular portion of the figure. 
This view of crisis, conflict, and war is focused more on 
the evolutionary realities of warfare vice its revolutionary 
possibilities and may be a useful tool for understanding the 
future of MIW. The arguments contained in the EMA framework 
will be the ones used in the concluding chapter. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
It was not the legions which crossed the Rubicon, 
but Caesar. 
- Napoleon Bonaparte 
With the primary surveys of the MIW concept and the 
trends in information age conflict completed, the final task 
that remains is to fuse the core arguments made in each of 
these main sections. This thesis will use three key areas 
derived from the mainbody to develop a composite picture of 
MIW's place in the information age. 
A. STAYING POWER 
One of the more obvious conclusions that can be drawn 
from the MIW analysis is that the irregular approach to 
naval warfare has been around a long time. The application 
of MIW is not a new phenomenon, nor has it recently come 
into existence in response to modern warfare or twentieth 
century improvements in technology. These facts support this 
theses primary argument that maritime irregular warfare is a 
fundamental part of naval warfare strategy. Although 
conventional naval warfare holds the premier position in 
naval affairs, MIW constitutes a less understood but equally 
important "other" tradition in naval affairs. Two 
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complementary relationships found in the MIW analysis 
account for its historical staying power. 
Sir Francis Drake’s exploits in the Caribbean and later 
along the coasts of mainland Europe; Britain’s decision to 
employ Q-ships against the German U-boat juggernaut during 
World War I; and the approach that the Italian l o t h  Light 
Flotilla took in countering the Allies conventional 
superiority in the Mediterranean during World War I1 all 
originated from one common trait: an unconventional mindset. 
Throughout ‘history the ability to think and act 
unconventionally has allowed MIW forces to identify enemy 
weaknesses and capitalize on opportunities by combining 
innovative, unorthodox operational techniques with the most 
current technologies. Unconstrained, MIW has had a powerful 
influence on naval affairs and succeeded in affecting the 
outcomes of conflict both at sea and on land. Drake’s unique 
vision and unorthodox methods revolutionized sea power and 
his exploits had a lasting effect on British strategic 
thought in the late 1500‘s. In terms of numbers of German 
submarines sunk during World War I, the overall 
effectiveness of British Q-ships can be called into 
question. But, the consequences of this protracted special 
operation succeeded in shifting the overall balance of World 
War I and played a decisive role in the war’s final outcome. 
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Finally, the Italian l o t h  Light Flotilla's unconventional 
mindset and approach is ultimately what enabled it to deploy 
a potent unconventional response to the Allies conventional 
superiority in the Mediterranean that is still the subject 
of intense study. 
Another reason for MIW's longevity is its operational 
flexibility. Through the years MIW has come packaged in a 
variety of forms and offered a number of unique 
capabilities. Highlighting this point played an important 
role in determining which cases would be examined in the MIW 
typology. Additionally, maritime irregular warfare has 
proven its effectiveness across the spectrum of war and been 
utilized offensively and defensively for both protracted and 
short duration special operations. In addition to these more 
recognizable roles in conflict, the MIW approach has been 
equally effective below the military horizon by providing 
alternative avenues for intelligence gathering along with 
highly sophisticated entrepreneurial options. Far from the 
convenzional image of irregular warfare as a fragile form of 
warfare easily countered by conventional doctrine, 
restricted in range, and inevitably the ad hoc strategy of a 
weaker opponent, MIW has shown operational dynamism and 
proven capable of persevering under extreme conditions while 
providing an array of diverse options. 
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The continual evolution and upgrade of MIW capabilities 
has been the key to its flexibility. As MIW continues to 
expand into every aspect of the naval environment, it 
creates additional opportunities and provides battlefield 
commanders with the ability to act unconventionally and 
rapidly adjust to changing situations. When combined with 
the right type of people afforded the freedom to think and 
act unconventionally, MIW has proven to offer a highly 
effective style of warfare with an impressive record of 
accomplishments to back it up. 
Working in tandem, the unconventional mindset and MIW’s 
inherent flexibility account for MIW’s historical staying 
power. The elements identified in the emerging geostrategic 
setting discussion also fit nicely with these two tenets and 
point to MIW’s continued longevity. 
The first point to be made in the emerging geostrategic 
setting disscussion was that crisis, conflict, and war will 
continue to be a fundamental part of the near-term strategic 
landscape. Upon closer inspection two identifiable fault 
lines were addressed: 1) the geostrategic reordering, and 2 )  
the rapid pace of technological change. Maritime irregular 
warfare has already proven to be a very capable complement 
to the trends emerging in these two categories. For 
starters, the simultaneous increase in the number of 
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internal breakdowns and the rise of aggressive non-state 
threats are credited as fueling a potential geostrategic 
reordering. This translates into a likely increase in 
activity throughout the low-intensity spectrum and in other 
forms of conflict below the conventional threshold. Maritime 
irregular warfare has already been tapped in response to a 
similar environmental dynamic. For example, during Eritrea’s 
thirty-year fight for independence from Ethiopia the EPLF’ s 
introduction of a hybrid high-speed gunboat enabled the 
employment a very successful MIW strategy against the 
Ethiopian Armed Forces. In Sri Lanka the LTTE is currently 
using a very effective MIW strategy in the northern part of 
the island to maintain control over strategically important 
locations along the Jaffna Peninsula. And, during times of 
relative peace, MIW concepts continue to be employed in 
conjunction with maritime piracy, and the maritime 
components of the drug trade. 
In each of these cases an aggressive non-state actor 
has pursued and profited from the advantages of an MIW 
strategy. In the first case MIW was part of an overall 
strategy that eventually led to the creation of the state of 
Eritrea. In the second case, while the war between the LTTE 
and Sri Lankan government still continues, few will deny 
that the LTTE is currently the most dangerous terrorist- 
c 
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insurgent group in the world. The development of an 
effective MIW denial strategy has effectively allowed the 
LTTE to maintain intermittent control over strategic points 
along the Jaffna Peninsula in the face of a much larger 
conventionally equipped opponent. And in the last example, 
the sophisticated entrepreneurial forms of MIW have proven 
to be operationally robust in the face of conventional 
counter measures and have yet to be effectively suppressed. 
These are just a few examples but they all suggest that as 
the elements identified in the geostrategic reordering begin 
to take shape, MIW will continue to be called upon globally. 
The rapid pace of technological change was the other 
area of focus contained within the emerging geostrategic 
setting. While independent IW appears to be evolving into 
its own separate form of warfare, MIW will be incorporated 
into the integrated aspects of IW that involve improving 
situational awareness. In addition to MIW maintaining the 
collateral ability to clarify the battlefield through 
intelligence collection, one emerging trend in this arena 
seems clear, maritime irregular warfare forces will no 
longer be allowed to conduct unsupervised operations. 
In large-scale engagements the increasingly integrated 
nature of conventional warfare and its rapid acceleration in 
operational tempo will force MIW forces to become apart of 
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the commanders common operational picture. Increasingly, 
battlefield commanders will demand improved monitoring of 
MIW forces while in the field. This desire for improved 
tracking and monitoring of MIW forces will also extend down 
to smaller-scale confrontations in which MIW is the focus of 
effort. As the spread of sophisticated information 
technologies along with the advanced information 
architecture linking these systems together becomes readily 
available, MIW forces will increasingly become part of the 
integrated aspects of IW emerging in the geostrategic 
setting. 
The other, non-technical, side of technological change 
that affects the future of MIW involves the adoption of 
cutting edge technologies. Maritime irregular warfare has a 
history of staying on the cusp of cutting edge technology 
and tactical innovation. During World War I1 PT boats were 
renowned for their speed and maneuverability. And in the 
Mediterranean the l o t h  Light Flotilla developed a submarine 
entry/exit method that allowed them to launch and recover 
Maiale’s while remaining submerged, greatly reducing the 
risk of detection. When MIW forces have not been able to 
produce state-of-the-art hardware inhouse, they have always 
found other innovative ways to benefit from the advantages 
of the latest leading technologies. This alternative path to 
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increased capability has led to the creation of some very 
capable hybrid MIW forces. The information age conflict 
analysis suggests that it is forces displaying these traits 
that will pose the greatest challenge to less dynamic 
conventionally oriented militaries. 
A review of P I I W ’  s record reveals that technological 
change has never equated to obsolescence from the MIW 
perspective. Maritime irregular warfare forces have proven 
to be quite resilient and comfortable with the pace of 
technological change, and have consistently used cutting 
edge technology to gain an advantage over the enemy and stay 
unpredictable. 
B. HIGH-LEVERAGE FORCES 
Another area of convergence found between the MIW 
analysis and the trends emerging in crisis, conflict, and 
war concerns the enduring requirement for high-leverage 
forces. These types of forces can usually be characterized 
by small investments in men and materiel relative to the 
costs of manning and equipping larger formations for 
conventionally oriented operations. In addition, the 
signature of any high-leverage force is the ability to yield 
disproportionately large results in relation to its size. 
One theme that runs throughout the information age conflict 
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framework is that in the near-term future there will be 
expanding opportunities for forces displaying these traits. 
Historically speaking, MIW elements have always fit the 
definition of a high-leverage force. The cases highlighted 
in the MIW typology implicitly point out this side of the 
maritime irregular warfare concept. Sir Francis Drake's 
refinement of the classical maritime raiding strategy easily 
qualifies as an example of a high-leverage force. His unique 
vision and unorthodox methods revolutionized sea power and 
his exploits had a lasting effect on British strategic 
thought. In this instance the costs, in terms of men and 
materiel, of outfitting naval guerrillas for maritime 
raiding operations were minor compared to the costs of 
assembling the men and materiel necessary for much larger 
fleet actions. One defining feature of all MIW forces has 
been their comparatively small size and low cost, relative 
to the manning and materiel requirements necessary for 
fielding conventional forces of the day. This also helps 
partially explain maritime irregular warfare's universal 




The same kind of logical cost-benefit analysis can be 
applied to the MIW cases cited during World War I. Here, 
Britain's employment of Q-ships easily passes both 
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conditions necessary for consideration as a high-leverage 
force. Meanwhile, the blocking of Zeebrugge operation, while 
falling short of its intended objective, did possess the 
potential to shift the overall naval balance of the war with 
a small investment in men and materiel. 
Both World War I1 cases cited stand as classic examples 
of very capable and successful high-leverage MIW forces in 
action.63 In the Pacific campaign the PT boats high-leverage 
advantage originally grew out of the necessity to blunt the 
Imperial Japanese Navy‘s conventional superiority with a 
low-cost , expendable response. Later, U. S. “mosquito boats” 
solidified their position in the Pacific campaign by being 
operationally flexible and by evolving and adapting over the 
course of the war. But by far the best example of a high- 
leverage MIW force during World War I1 comes out of the 
Mediterranean Theater. For  three years Decirna 
iYas/Mariassal to  relentlessly engaged in unconventional MIW 
operations against the Allies. During that time it came to 
63 It should also be pointed out that it is roughly during 
this period that MIW actions became increasingly labor 
intensive. Although the quantities of men and materiel 
remained relatively small, because of the rising complexity 
of MIW operations even small loses could be critical given 
the time needed to train new MIW personnel and ready new MIW 
weaponry. This fact may take on even greater emphasis in the 
near-term future as more advanced technologies and systems 




epitomize the modern high-leverage MIW force and embody the 
traits accounting for MIW’s historical staying power. 
Although the Royal Italian Navy ended its offensive role in 
1943 by surrendering to the Allies, while operational Decima 
Mas’ maritime irregular warfare strategy succeeded in 
challenging the Allies naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. 
The presence of high-leverage forces has been one of 
warfare‘s constants in the years following World War I1 as 
well. Maritime irregular warfare has successfully answered 
that calling in such places as the Korean Peninsula, the 
coast of Eritrea, the Falkland Islands, and Sri Lanka to 
recognize just a few contemporary examples. Modern-day 
pirates and the maritime components of the drug trade have 
also tapped into MIW’ s low-cost, high yield advantage and 
the analysis of information age conflict suggests that the 
need and opportunities for these types of forces will 
continue unabated into the near-term future. 
The tactical technology trends disscussion went the 
furthest in actually exploring and explaining the future 
opportunities for high-leverage forces. A brief summary 
sheds light on some of the emerging warfighting trends that 
will enable MIW forces to maintain their high-leverage 
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For maritime irregular warfare to survive on the future 
battlefield M I W  forces will first have to come to terms 
with, and capitalize on three technology driven variables: 
precision, range, and time. In the T3 disscussion the global 
push towards establishing the primacy of precision, the 
ability to strike targets at greater range, and the ensuing 
increase in operational tempo were credited as the force 
behind units becoming smaller, more mobile, and dispersed on 
the future battlefield. This part of the high-leverage 
equation may not be that difficult f o r  MIW to achieve. In a 
certain sense M I W  has always fit this mold. Maritime 
irregular warfare has shown itself to be predisposed to 
using advanced technology in order to gain an advantage, and 
MIW forces have always been packaged in small mobile units. 
The key for MIW in this area may be understanding this 
historical dynamic and incorporating the right technologies 
and systems that allow MIW to stay operationally dynamic. 
The second area that MIW will have to master in order 
to maintain its high-leverage label involves the trends 
associated with the changing nature of command. In order to 
compensate for the time compression on the battlefield, 
decentralized tactical command and greater centralized 
strategic control will be needed so that M I W  units can react 
quickly to rapidly changing situations while remaining 
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connected. Devolving greater freedom of action to 
subordinate units can only be operationalized by reducing 
the layers of command and control, and improving information 
avenues. By taking these steps towards more streamlined and 
efficient command and control structures the lethality of 
the small unit increases and MIW’ s high-leverage advantage 
remains secure. 
It should once again be stressed that the concepts 
described in this section will not reside so le ly  in the 
domain of the premier militaries. Whether developed inhouse 
or arrived at by combining and adapting dissimilar systems 
they will be available to everyone. Applied by an opponent 
capable of thinking and acting unconventionally, high- 
leverage MIW forces operating with an 
asymmetric/asynchronous strategy will pose a real threat to 
a less dynamic or conventionally oriented opponent. 
. 
C. INTEGRATED AND INDEPENDENT MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE 
In the near-term future when MIW is tasked to provide 
unorthodox options for sea control it will be provided 
either as an integrated part of a much larger plan, or 
independently as the sole means of achieving strategic 
objectives. Historically, all MIW operations have either 
been integrated or independent, making this distinction is 
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not necessarily new. For example, during World War I1 PT 
boats were an integrated part of the U.S. Pacific campaign 
strategy. As the war progressed the operational flexibility 
of the PT force allowed it to remain an integral part of the 
island hoping strategy. Similarly, in the Mediterranean the 
l o t h  Light Flotilla was originally a minor unit integrated 
into the war plans of the conventionally oriented Royal 
Italian Navy. As the Allies summarily reduced the more 
conventional components of the RMI, the l o t h  Light Flotilla 
transitioned into the primary offensive arm within the 
Italian Navy. In the Pacific campaign MIW forces played a 
valuable supporting role in the conventionally driven war 
plan, while in the Mediterranean the l o t h  Light Flotilla was 
forced to slowly grow out of its supporting role as 
conventional RMI forces were defeated. The same cooperative 
relationship that existed between regular and irregular 
warfare during this period can be found in many of the 
conflicts that have followed the Second World War. In each 
case, MIW has provided unique capabilities that 
complemented, enabled, and enhanced conventional forces. For 
integrated MIW operations to be successful MIW forces have 
historically relied upon, and maintained, a strong 
connection with the conventional fleet in order to ensure 
the proper synchronization and unity of effort. 
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In the near-term future integrated operations will 
remain a key role for MIW forces that operate in tandem with 
a conventional component. By clarifying the battlefield for 
conventional commanders through intelligence gathering 
operations and simplifying the battlefield by eliminating 
critical targets linked to the conventional campaign, MIW 
will continue to provide a vital force multiplier that 
conventional forces can not afford to dismiss. Additionally, 
by working closely with regular naval forces, the irregular 
approach to naval warfare becomes more widely accepted as 
MIW’ s capabilities are put on display, meanwhile 
opportunities for employment and additional capabilities 
gained through joint operations with the conventional 
battlefleet expand. 
Aided by improved information systems that will enable 
MIW units to be tied into the conventional campaign, and the 
increasing lethality of the small unit, highly mobile MIW 
forces will continue to provide unconventional solutions to 
complex military problems during conventional campaigns. The 
rationale behind MIW’s historical staying power and its 
high-leverage advantage will help facilitate MIW‘s place on 
the conventional and unconventional battlefields of the 
future. In the premier navies that view naval affairs 
primarily through a conventional perspective, MIW forces 
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will be required to provide critical, complementary niche 
capabilities and continuously upgrade and adjust to meet the 
needs of the fleet. By doing so, the synergy achieved by 
synchronizing regular and irregular naval warfare will allow 
strategic objectives to be attained faster, and with fewer 
costs associated with warfare. 
Not every group waging war on the sea has the luxury of 
being able to field conventional and unconventional forces 
at the same time, nor are they required to when backed by a 
sound independent MIW strategy.64 Independent operations 
imply that MIW is the primary means of achieving naval 
objectives, not just an adjunct in a conventional naval 
campaign. In this context MIW can suspend the bonds that 
hold it in a supporting role to regular naval warfare, thus 
allowing MIW operations to become the focus of effort. Where 
resources are stretched thin, independent MIW has proven to 
be an effective alternative and counter to conventional 
naval warfare by allowing all combat power available to be 
employed in the most effective way possible. For instance, 
64 The RMA analysis suggests that the greatest threat to 
forces relying on high-tech advances for conventional 
superiority will most likely come from an opponent employing 
low-technology tools and a highly sophisticated 
asymmetrical/asynchronous strategy to circumvent, blind, or 
nullify a high-tech advantage. Maritime irregular warfare is 
particularly well equipped to serve in that function. 
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during Eritrea’s fight for independence a severe lack of 
resources restricted the EPLF from employing conventional 
assets. Therefore, they turned to a low investment, high 
yield independent MIW strategy that proved to be an 
effective answer to the conventional Ethiopian Navy. The 
quality of the conventional opponent can also be a deciding 
factor in the turn towards independent MIW. One of reasons 
behind the LTTE’s independent MIW strategy is that 
conventional assets would be easier for the SLN to target 
and destroy. In both of these examples independent maritime 
irregular warfare in effect became the naval strategy. 
The conflict in the information age analysis suggests 
that, as fighting units become smaller, swifter, and more 
lethal in the near-term future, the ability of MIW to act 
independently in pursuit of strategic objectives will 
increase. The lessons learned from past successes and the 
trends identified in the EMA will allow independent MIW 
operations to challenge and/or negate conventional naval 
operations. When MIW’s doctrinal flexibility and diverse 
range of action are added to this mix, independent MIW 
operations have the potential to pose a direct threat to 
conventional opponents. Historically, MIW has proven to be 
the most operationally dynamic when placed in a leading role 
and unconstrained by having to work within a conventional 
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system. Aided by the trends emerging in information age 
conflict, independent MIW strategies will increasingly 
become an impending part of the naval war paradigm. 
Regardless of whether the operations are integrated or 
independent the findings of this thesis suggest that when 
MIW is brought into action in the near-term future it will 
be strategically employed in two basic forms.65 In the first 
form, a single MIW operation may be initiated with the 
intention of yielding immediate results, as in a coup de 
main. An alternative method that also seems to be gaining 
strength involves mounting a MIW campaign. This would take 
the form of a series of interrelated missions in which the 
cumulative effects had a crippling effect on the enemy. 
1. Decisive Action 
Although the World War I examples of MIW were not 
resounding successes, the style and approach they introduced 
may actually hold the key to MIW’s future, especially when 
the trends in information age conflict are factored in. As 
envisioned the blocking of Zeebrugge was designed to take 
6 5  Maritime irregular warfare can perform a variety of tasks 
and provide numerous capabilities. This theses primary focus 
is on the strategic application of MIW in the information 
age. The two basic forms identified here will not caver a l l  
the possible uses of MIW in the future, but rather seek to 
distinguish the general direction and strategic character of 
future MIW operations. 
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the German U-boats stationed at Bruges out of war with a 
single, swift, decisive stroke. While this MIW operation was 
launched with the intention of delivering immediate 
strategic results by shifting the naval balance, it was 
still an integrated part of a much larger on going war. 
Although this operation did yield some short-term success, 
the originally desired long-term results were not achieved 
for a number of reasons cited in the MIW typology. 
At the core, the blocking of Zeebrugge was planned as a 
decisive MIW action against a fixed target on land. This is 
the critical point to take away from this short duration MIW 
operation. 
On the near-term battlefield MIW units will continue to 
engage in coup de main style decisive actions similar in 
design to the one attempted at Zeebrugge. A review of the 
trends emerging in information age conflict and the 
evolution of the MIW concept suggest that in the near-term 
future these types of operations will most likely be 
conducted against fixed targets on land. The increasingly 
destructive power of the small unit suggests that this type 
of raiding will become more effective in the future. 
The high-technology trends identified in the RMA 
disscussion suggest that in the near-term future the initial 
period may in effect be the only period of future warfare. 
This analysis further indicates that the rapid pace of 
technological change is ushering in a new era of increased 
operational tempo. Therefore, in order for MIW forces to 
maintain the element of surprise, military actions will have 
to become short, sharp, and decisive.66 These kinds of 
sudden, crippling blows will not be delivered against 
dispersed, mobile targets, but against critical targets that 
are fixed, and within close proximity to the littorals. 
2. The MIW Campaign 
The Q-ship campaign undertaken by Britain during World 
War I may also provide valuable clues to MIW’s future when 
the trends identified in information age conflict and the 
evolution of MIW are combined. The British Q-ship campaign 
was launched in response to effective U-boat operations 
slowly paralyzing British war production and sea 
communications during World War I. While the tangible 
results of the Q-ship campaign were modest at best, the 
consequences of this protracted maritime special operation 
forced Germany to radically alter its submarine doctrine, 
substantially reducing U-boat effectiveness on patrol. In 
66 Decisive action may also come in alternative forms in the 
near-term future. For instance, the Information Age Conflict 
analysis suggested that winning by mass disruption and 
paralysis may increasingly become the strategy of choice 
against technology dependent opponents. 
96 
addition, fear of Q-ships led to sinkings without warning, 
which had the unintended effect of provoking neutrals into 
entering the war against Germany. 
At its core, the Q-ship campaign represented a 
protracted maritime irregular warfare operation against 
highly mobile targets at sea. This is the critical 
conclusion to draw from this example and something that, 
again, will be reenergized by technology trends. 
A review of the evolution of MIW and the trends 
emerging in information age conflict suggest that in the 
near-term future MIW forces will increasingly engage in 
protracted campaigns similar in character to British Q-ship 
operations during World War I. Additionally, these campaigns 
appear to be the most likely in conflicts below the 
conventional threshold as witnessed in the Eritrean and Sri 
Lankan examples. 
The primary enabler for the MIW campaign on the near- 
term battlefield will be the advances accrued from improved 
command and control. The MIW campaign differs from decisive 
action not only in terms of the time horizon but also in the 
measures of effectiveness used to define success or failure. 
With a single coup de main, the immediate military result 
following the mission is what signifies success or failure. 
In a campaign the process is subtler as it is the cumulative 
97 
effect of the missions that become more important. As units 
become smaller, more mobile, and dispersed upon the 
battlefield in order to avoid being decapitated by a single 
decisive action, MIW will need to develop the ability to 
find and destroy these hard to find targets. The move 
towards decentralized tactical command with greater 
centralized control and the technological advances leading 
towards a more transparent battlefield and improved 
situational awareness will combine to enable MIW forces to 
better succeed in campaigns similar to the one undertaken by 
Q-ships during World War I. 
In conclusion, maritime irregular warfare will be an 
active element of future conflicts. When the arguments 
supporting MIW’s staying power and high-leverage advantage 
are combined with the primary enablers driving MIW’s move 
toward decisive actions and the MIW campaign, a powerful 
image of maritime irregular warfare in the near-term future 
begins to emerge. By combining the evolution of MIW with the 
emerging trends in crisis, conflict, and war this thesis has 
developed a picture that indicates MIW may be gaining 
momentum in naval affairs. In addition to putting the 
irregular side of naval warfare into perspective and 
offering a vision of MIW’s future, it is hoped that the 
approach and broader themes developed throughout this thesis 
9 8  
will spark increased interest in, and discussion of, the 
future of maritime irregular warfare. 
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